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DECRYPTING OUR SECURITY: A 
BIPARTISAN ARGUMENT FOR A RATIONAL 
SOLUTION TO THE ENCRYPTION 
CHALLENGE 
Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent terrorist attacks in Garland, Texas,1 Paris, France,2 and more recently 
in Brussels, Belgium,3 and San Bernardino, California,4 have vividly demon-
strated the increasing threat the United States faces at the hands of internation-
al terrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. gov-
                                                          
* Jamil N. Jaffer is an Adjunct Professor of Law and Director of the Homeland and National 
Security Law Program at the George Mason University School of Law. Mr. Jaffer previous-
ly served in a variety of national security positions in the legislative and executive branches, 
including in the Bush Administration as Associate Counsel to the President and as Counsel 
to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice and also 
as a Senior Counsel to the House Intelligence Committee. Daniel J. Rosenthal is an Associ-
ate Managing Director with Kroll, a global leader in investigations, risk mitigation, compli-
ance, security, and incident response solutions. He also serves as an Adjunct Professor at the 
University of Maryland’s Honors College, where he teaches an award-winning course on 
national security dilemmas. Mr. Rosenthal previously served in a variety of national security 
positions in the Obama Administration, including as Director for Counterterrorism with the 
National Security Council, as Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security at the Department of Justice, and as a Senior Associate General Counsel for the 
Director of National Intelligence. The authors would like to thank Wendy Everette and 
Alexis Wilhelmi of George Mason University Law School for their excellent research assis-
tance. 
 1 Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & Fernanda Santos, Gunman in Texas Shoot-
ing Was F.B.I. Suspect in Jihad Inquiry, N. Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1ABVyYf. 
 2 Anthony Faiola & Souad Mekhennet, Paris Attacks Were Carried Out By Three 
Groups Tied To Islamic State, Official Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2015) 
http://wapo.st/1HJk4zJ. 
 3 Karen Yourish et al., Brussels is Latest Target in Islamic State’s Assault on West, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1VrAz7y. 
 4 Adam Nagourney, Ian Lovett & Richard Pérez-Peña, San Bernardino Shooting Kills 
at Least 14; Two Suspects Are Dead, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1Tw5gWG. 
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ernment has taken major steps, over the course of years, to bolster its ability to 
detect and thwart attacks on the homeland.5 These tools—in particular the col-
lection of content of overseas communications pursuant to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 20086—have proven criti-
cal to the government’s ability to protect the homeland from terrorist threats.7 
Alarmingly, as a direct result of the devastating disclosures of classified infor-
mation—including the details of this program’s operation—by Edward Snow-
den in June 2013,8 terrorists have gained significant insight into the ability of 
the United States to gain access to their electronic communications, and there-
fore, have taken steps to change their communications methods and tactics, 
including through the widespread adoption of encryption technologies to hide 
their communications,9 in an attempt to evade law enforcement and plot future 
                                                          
 5 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Office of Legal Counsel to the 
Attorney General, Review of the Legality of the STELLAR WIND Program 7 (May 6, 
2004) [hereinafter STELLAR WIND Memorandum], http://1.usa.gov/1LaJzfb (noting that 
in response to the September 11 attacks and to counter the ongoing threat posed by al 
Qaeda, in early October 2011, “the President directed the Secretary of Defense to use the 
capabilities of the Department of Defense, in particular the National Security Agency 
(“NSA”), to undertake a program of electronic surveillance designed to [] counter[] the 
threat of further al Qaeda attacks within the United States.”); Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 6 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101, 122 Stat. 2436, 
2438 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)) (providing clear statutory authority under 
the supervision of the Federal courts for the United States to gain access, in the United 
States, to the global communications of foreign intelligence targets—including terrorists—
located overseas). 
 7 See Letter from James R. Clapper, Director of Nat’l Intelligence & Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker, Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Nancy 
Pelosi, Democratic Leader, Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader 2 (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://1.usa.gov/1nsGiME (“Intelligence collection under Title VII has produced and con-
tinues to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the nation against interna-
tional terrorism and other threats.”). 
 8 Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM To Date, WASH. POST 
(June 12, 2013), http://wapo.st/1QCGvZE; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British 
Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://wapo.st/1LcAw6p. Note that these articles include both 
information that the government may not have acknowledged as well as information that 
may or may not be accurate. See infra text accompanying note 52. 
 9 Joe Palazzolo, FBI Stymied by Islamic State’s Use of Encryption, Director Says, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2015, 1:53 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1O3fc9Z; Benjamin Wittes, What 
Role Did Encryption Play in Paris?, LAWFARE (Nov. 16, 2015, 7:40 AM), 
http://bit.ly/1R1oyQn; David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Encrypted Messaging Apps Face 
New Scrutiny Over Possible Role in Paris Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1MSkUpP; Shane Harris, This is ISIS’s New Favorite App for Secret Messag-
es, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 16, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://thebea.st/1SVu3mI. 
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attacks without any—or at most a greatly diminished—risk of detection.10 
As a result of these tactical changes by terrorists, law enforcement has ar-
gued that its ability to identify and thwart future attacks to the homeland has 
been significantly diminished. Indeed, FBI Director James Comey recently 
characterized this widespread adoption by terrorists of encryption as a “grave” 
and “growing” threat to the country’s national security.11 Investigators now 
believe that the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris may have used encryption as 
a means of evading detection by law enforcement.12 It is quite possible that the 
perpetrators of other recent attacks, such as Garland, Texas and San Bernardi-
no, California, did so as well.13 
                                                          
 10 For the purposes of this paper, the term encryption means the conversion of plaintext 
into ciphertext using an algorithm to render the data unreadable without the proper cipher 
and key to decrypt it. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NISTIR 7298 REV. 2, 
GLOSSARY OF KEY INFORMATION SECURITY TERMS 69 (Richard Kissel ed. 2013), 
http://1.usa.gov/1Q7m0We (“Encryption Algorithm: Set of mathematically expressed rules 
for rendering data unintelligible by executing a series of conversions controlled by a key.”). 
Strong encryption generally refers to encryption with particularly long key lengths. See 
NORMAN D. JORSTARD & LANDGRAVE T. SMITH, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, 20NCDROM, 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM METRICS 15 (1997), http://1.usa.gov/1Tnlepb. 
Street and Walker have recently suggested a three graduation scale for indicating the 
strength of cryptography based on key length: ‘Weak Cryptography,’ applications 
with secret keys of 40 bits (DES, RC2, RC4), and for public key 512 bits or less; 
‘Good Cryptography,’ secret key of 56 bits (typically DES), public key 512 to 1024 
bits; and, ‘Strong Cryptography,’ secret key lengths in excess of 56 bits and public 
keys that are 1024 bits and larger. 
Id. (internal footnotes and citations omitted); see also MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’YS OFF., RE-
PORT ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 2 (2015) [hereinafter MANHATTAN 
D.A.’S REPORT], http://bit.ly/1WYUIVq. 
Encryption involves converting readable data (sometimes referred to as “plaintext”) 
into scrambled, unreadable data (sometimes referred to as “ciphertext”) using an algo-
rithm that renders the data unreadable by a human or computer without the proper ci-
pher and key to decrypt it. Data transmitted between phones, computers, and other 
digital devices can be encrypted [] while in transit between those devices and [] on the 
devices themselves. 
Id. 
 11 Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and 
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 114th Cong. 10 (2015) [hereinafter 
Going Dark Hearing] (joint statement of Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Depart-
ment of Justice, and James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
http://1.usa.gov/1Xd65VE (“Mr. Chairman, the Department of Justice believes that the chal-
lenges posed by the Going Dark problem are grave, growing, and extremely complex”). 
 12 Ben Wittes, Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark: Part I, LAWFARE (July 9, 
2015, 10:29 AM) [hereinafter Wittes, Going Dark: Part I], http://bit.ly/1LN77qr; Paul Tas-
si, How ISIS Terrorists May Have Used PlayStation 4 To Discuss And Plan Attacks, FORBES 
(Nov. 14, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://onforb.es/21TMT5M but see Bruce Schneier, Paris Ter-
rorists Used Double ROT-13 Encryption, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Nov. 18, 2015, 3:35 PM), 
http://bit.ly/1YhriPA. 
 13 Danny Yadron, Does Encryption Really Help ISIS? Here’s What You Need to Know, 
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Even as terrorists take action to secure themselves against American surveil-
lance, the overall quantity of terrorist attacks worldwide—including those di-
rected at the West—are on the rise,14 and it is nearly inevitable that we will 
continue to be victimized by smaller-scale attacks such as those we have re-
cently experienced. While the groups plotting terrorist attacks worldwide to-
day—a cast of characters that includes ISIS, al Qaeda, and their affiliates—
face very real difficulties in pulling off a mass casualty attack on the homeland 
on a scale akin to the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is little doubt that 
they have the ongoing intent, and are constantly plotting, to do so.15 And, with-
out continuous, aggressive action to take the fight to these terrorist groups 
overseas and continued vigilance at home supported by strong law enforce-
ment and intelligence efforts, there is a serious chance that they will succeed in 
pulling off another major attack in the coming years. In our view—born of sig-
nificant national security experience on both sides of the political spectrum and 
in various branches of the federal government16— the growing trend towards 
                                                                                                                                      
WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Dec. 4, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://on.wsj.com/1Svrfiq. 
 14 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2014, at 8, 11, 
16-17, 25 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1IV1G3y. 
 15 The recent attacks in Paris and San Bernardino were perpetrated at the direction of, or 
at least were inspired by, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). See Rukmini Cal-
limachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks ‘First of the Storm’, N. Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1Nxm5eZ; see also Missy Ryan et al., Both San Bernardino 
Attackers Pledged Allegiance To The Islamic State, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 
2015) http://wapo.st/24MSA4H. These attacks vividly demonstrate the increasing risk of 
terrorist attacks on the homeland that we face at the hands of international terrorists. ISIS, 
and other violent terrorist groups including the Khorasan Group, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (“AQAP”), and the various affiliates and offshoots of these organizations, remain 
committed to raising a generation of killers who predicate their violence on a distorted view 
of Islam to spread their totalitarian ideology, impose their oppressive way of life around the 
world, and cause as many deaths as they can to non-adherents. And while ISIS initially 
spent significant time and capital on its localized ambitions to establish an operational gov-
ernment in Iraq and Syria, they are now, alarmingly, focusing much more of their attention 
on planning or inspiring attacks in the West, including the United States homeland. See 
Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (March 2015), 
http://theatln.tc/1N4APrk; see also Paul D. Shinkman, The Evolving Extremist Threat, U.S. 
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://bit.ly/1UOaOyj. 
 16 It is worth noting that a number of presidential candidates—in both parties—have 
decisively raised this issue also, calling for rational solutions. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton Lays 
Out Comprehensive Plan To Bolster Homeland Security, THE BRIEFING (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://hrc.io/1W4mbR5. 
Now, encryption of mobile devices and communications does present a particularly 
tough problem with important implications for security and civil liberties. Law en-
forcement and counterterrorism professionals warn that impenetrable encryption may 
make it harder for them to investigate plots and prevent future attacks. On the other 
hand, there are very legitimate worries about privacy, network security, and creating 
new vulnerabilities that bad actors can exploit. I know there’s no magic fix to this di-
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default-on, ubiquitous strong encryption, while providing critically important 
privacy and security benefits, also means the United States is more likely to 
face challenges in preventing the next major terrorist attack in the West. 
As such, we must act now to address the encryption challenge. Doing so is 
not only the responsible thing to do to protect our nation, but it maximizes the 
chances that we can continue to protect the legitimate—and critically im-
portant—privacy and security benefits that ubiquitous strong encryption pro-
vides to freedom activists, consumers, technologists, and most importantly, the 
average citizen, every day. Because security means very little without privacy, 
and vice versa, the current debate—which is polarized between those who 
claim that government access to encrypted communications is either impossi-
ble or will destroy both security and privacy on the Internet and those who 
claim that a lack of access to such data will mean that the government “goes 
dark,” essentially flying blind while trying to stop active threats—is vastly un-
helpful and highly unlikely to reach a stable result. Privacy groups, having al-
ready won a bruising battle on similar questions in the 1990s and having called 
significant portions of the technology industry to arms in the aftermath of the 
Snowden disclosures,17 are feeling their oats as they see the Justice Department 
and FBI unable to gain ground in their efforts to take more aggressive steps to 
regain lawful access to encrypted communications.18 Likewise, law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies, licking their wounds after having lost these 
battles, are increasingly turning to authorized disclosures, or leaks, regarding 
use of encryption by terrorist groups in active plots and threats in the hopes 
                                                                                                                                      
lemma that will satisfy all these concerns. But we can’t just throw up our hands. The 
tech community and the government have to stop seeing each other as adversaries and 
start working together to keep us safe from terrorists.  And even as we make sure law 
enforcement officials get the tools they need to prevent attacks, it’s essential that we 
also make sure jihadists don’t get the tools they need to carry out attacks. 
Id.; see also Patrick Kulp, Jeb Bush Says He Would Compel Tech Companies to Hand Over 
Encrypted Data If President, MASHABLE (Jan. 15, 2016), http://on.mash.to/1puDqAy (noting 
that former Gov. Jeb Bush suggested that he might require companies to cooperate with 
government requests for information and argued that “[t]here needs to be complete dialogue 
with large technology companies…[t]hey understand there’s a national security risk.”); 
Jenna McLaughlin, Jeb Bush Comes Out Against Encryption, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 19, 
2015, 3:40 PM), http://bit.ly/1nsi0Cu (statement of Florida Governor Jeb Bush). 
If you create encryption, it makes it harder for the American government to do its job 
— while protecting civil liberties — to make sure that evildoers aren’t in our 
midst…We need to find a new arrangement with Silicon Valley in this regard because 
I think this is a very dangerous kind of situation. 
Id. 
 17 David Sirota, Has America Changed Since Edward Snowden’s Disclosures?, TRUTH-
DIG (June 14, 2015), http://bit.ly/1puDv7B. 
 18 See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Access to Encrypted User 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Perlroth & Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Ac-
cess], http://nyti.ms/1G6YAvL. 
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that these efforts will vividly demonstrate the problem and garner support for 
more aggressive measures before the next major attack.19 
While today the pendulum has decisively swung in the direction of those 
that oppose law enforcement and intelligence access to encrypted data, in our 
view, this is almost certainly an unsustainable balance. The reason is simple: 
we know, without question, that terrorist groups are using encryption to protect 
themselves from government surveillance;20 and we also know that these 
groups continue to plot significant, mass casualty attacks against the United 
States and our allies.21 When combined with the fact that multiple states have 
recently failed or are failing in the Middle East22 and ISIS continues to expand 
its territorial control in its effort to build a terrorist superstate—a state of play 
that provides opportunities for terrorist groups to coalesce, plan, and execute 
attacks23—there is a significant possibility that a major terrorist attack, planned 
using encrypted communications and likely more deadly than the recent horrif-
ic attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, will take place in the United States or 
Europe. 
When that day comes, unfortunately for those of us who believe that a ra-
tional balance between privacy and security is possible, any opportunity to de-
sign a security solution that appropriately accounts for what are very real, im-
portant, and legitimate privacy considerations will have been lost. As it was in 
the immediate aftermath following September 11, 2001,24 the political climate 
will likely provide little opportunity for any meaningful dialogue between the 
technology sector, advocacy groups, and the government to work together to 
find a sensible solution. Rather, in the wake of the next catastrophic attack on 
the homeland, the law enforcement and national security communities will 
likely be offered significant authority to address the encryption challenge, and 
at that point, in the scramble to quickly shore up the nation’s defenses against 
terrorists, the government will have little to no incentive to work with the most 
                                                          
 19 Id. 
 20 Kim Zetter, Security Manual Reveals the OPSEC Advice ISIS Gives Recruits, WIRED 
(Nov. 19, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://bit.ly/21XeBeG. 
 21 DAVID INSERRA, HERITAGE FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 4416, 69TH ISLAMIST TERRORIST 
PLOT: ONGOING SPIKE IN TERRORISM SHOULD FORCE CONGRESS TO FINALLY CONFRONT THE 
TERRORISM THREAT 1 (2015), http://bit.ly/1R1piVB. 
 22 Lee Ferran & Rym Momtaz, ISIS Trail of Terror, ABC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://abcn.ws/1rouSL7. 
 23 Id. (attributing ISIS’s success to the group’s use of the combination of “military ex-
pertise and unimaginable brutality” combined with taunting social media accounts and weak 
government forces). 
 24 See Jeffrey Rosen, Total Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), 
http://nyti.ms/1AA5cu1 (discussing the Bush administration’s Total Information Awareness 
Program, an attempt to implement information-sharing to prevent terrorism in response to 
the September 11 Attacks, and the opposition of privacy advocates to the program). 
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important communities of interest on the outside. Indeed, it is likely the gov-
ernment already has, or will quickly generate, draft legislation to address these 
issues that does not fully account for legitimate privacy and cybersecurity con-
cerns. 
Therefore, if the technology sector and advocacy groups are to realistically 
have a seat at the table, the time for action is now. While such a suggestion 
may seem counterintuitive given the fact that the current political climate—at 
least prior to the Paris and San Bernardino attacks—was strongly favorable to 
the views of the technology community and advocacy groups, given the threat, 
the possibility of a significant attack, and the likelihood that the use of encryp-
tion facilitates the success of such an attack, as well as the political climate that 
such a situation is virtually certain to engender, relying on the current climate 
is a mistake. Indeed, if we fail to take smart steps now, it is highly likely that 
action taken in the wake of future attacks will gut the hard-won gains made by 
privacy groups since the 1990s. 
The reason why is simple. Defending “warrant-proof” encryption25 on the 
merits is already a challenge today, and will likely become impossible in the 
aftermath of an attack. For all of the deeply-felt, strongly-held, and longstand-
ing skepticism of the government action, particularly when justified under the 
banner of national security, the American people have always acknowledged 
that the government plays an essential role in protecting physical security and 
that liberties must, at some level, give way to the government’s legitimate ac-
tivities, particularly in the realm of national security.26 It is for this very reason 
                                                          
 25 See Going Dark Hearing, supra note 11. 
[I]ncreasingly, we’re finding that even when we have the authority to search certain 
types of digital communications, we can’t get the information we need because the 
encryption has been designed so that the information is only available to the user and 
the providers are unable to comply with the court order or warrant….Crucial infor-
mation becomes, in effect, ‘warrant proof.’….[W]e can’t get access to information 
that is stored on someone’s smartphone, like a child pornographer’s photographs or a 
gang member’s saved text messages…And we also can no longer effectuate wiretap 
orders to intercept certain communications as they happen, like ISIL members plotting 
to carry out an attack in the U.S., or a kidnapper communicating with a coconspira-
tor… ISIL currently communicates on Twitter, sending communications to thousands 
of would-be followers right here in our country. When someone responds and the 
conversations begin, they are then directed to encrypted platforms for further commu-
nication. And even with a court order, we can’t see those communications. This is a 
serious threat and our inability to access these communications, with valid court or-
ders, is a real national security and public safety problem. 
Id.; see also Andrea Peterson, The Government and Privacy Advocates Can’t Agree On 
What ‘Strong’ Encryption Even Means, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), http://wapo.st/1RPfRvA 
(statement of Kiran S. Raj, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General at the Depart-
ment of Justice) (“Warrant-proof encryption, as distinct from strong encryption, is where 
you design a system in a manner where only the end user has access to the information.”). 
 26 Carroll Doherty, Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 
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that the first ten amendments, while at times seemingly absolute in their lan-
guage, have always been understood to allow for reasonable action by the gov-
ernment.27 And, indeed, in the case of the Fourth Amendment—the core pro-
tection against the type of government action that encryption is designed to 
limit—the very notion of reasonable government access is actually built into 
the text.28 As was the case following the September 11th attacks, and as we are 
currently seeing in Europe, otherwise privacy-focused countries will often tilt 
strongly towards security in the aftermath of a major terrorist incident.29 And 
though we may hope that this won’t be the case this time and that cooler heads 
will prevail, such hope is ephemeral at best and likely makes for bad policy 
decisions now. 
Yet, despite the urgency of this problem, and despite the increased aware-
ness of the threat posed to the homeland from terrorism, the United States’ de-
cision-making architecture is paralyzed; voices within the government,30 the 
technology sector,31 and the advocacy community32 argue that any effort to 
                                                                                                                                      
Era, PEW RES. CTR. (June 7, 2013), http://pewrsr.ch/1M3zHyM (stating that generally since 
9/11, Americans have valued national security over their civil liberties). 
 27 See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 
(1990) (upholding as constitutional a prohibition on the use of peyote because the prohibi-
tion was neutrally applicable and served a compelling government interest even though it 
conflicts with the free practice of religion); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 
(1986) (upholding a Navy uniform regulation that conflicted with a religious requirement). 
 28 The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated.” U.S. CONST., amend. IV. (emphasis added); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 
135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451-52 (2015) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)) (ex-
plaining that the Constitution only bars unreasonable searches). The Supreme Court has 
recognized as reasonable searches conducted by the government in a number of scenarios in 
which a warrant is impractical, including when necessary for public safety and in exigent 
circumstances. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-59 (1984) (creating a public 
safety exception in instances in which fulfilling the Miranda requirements would impede 
time-sensitive efforts to advance public safety); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 
(1970) (establishing a car search exception to the warrant requirement); Michigan v. Fisher, 
558 U.S. 45, 46 (2009) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)) (holding 
that police may enter a home without a warrant under the emergency aid exception); United 
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (holding that police may enter a home without 
a warrant in hot pursuit of a suspect). 
 29 Russell B. Wilson, A New Balance: National Security and Privacy in a Post 9-11 
World 3-4 (2014) (unpublished Honors Thesis, Colby College), http://bit.ly/1YzWau7. 
 30 Perlroth & Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Access, supra note 18. 
 31 Eric Newcomer, Apple CEO Defends Encryption, Opposes Government Back Door, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 20, 2015, 3:08 AM), http://bloom.bg/1nsij0b; Orin Kerr, Apple’s 
Dangerous Game, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Kerr, Apple’s Dangerous 
Game], http://wapo.st/1pbMvOS. 
 32 Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Strong Encryption Has a Posse, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 
(May 20, 2015), http://bit.ly/1R3P4i6. 
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undermine terrorists’ ability to use encryption to communicate necessarily un-
dermines the availability of encryption for beneficent purposes.33 And the na-
tional security establishment clings desperately to its metaphor that the gov-
ernment is “going dark” despite its failure to date (by virtue of inability or un-
willingness) to demonstrate clearly to the public that its capabilities overall 
have dropped off dramatically.34 
As a result of the overheated rhetoric on both sides, the nation now finds it-
self in the throes of a dangerous stalemate. The privacy and technology com-
munity believes it is winning, and therefore feels no need to negotiate; to the 
contrary it continues to press the government to be even less active than it al-
ready is; and the national security community, continuously raising the alarm 
and not content to continue to wait, also understands that events may signifi-
cantly change the state of play in their favor.35 The outcome of this stalemate is 
plain as day: The government is being squeezed into inaction on the legislative 
and regulatory fronts, and is instead settling for modest efforts to initiate some 
voluntary cooperative work with an industry that is likely to have little, if any, 
substantive impact on the very real issues at stake.36 
                                                          
 33 Andrea Peterson & Ellen Nakashima, Obama Administration Explored Ways To By-
pass Smartphone Encryption, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015), http://wapo.st/1R2rjTv; Bruce 
Schneier, Why We Encrypt, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (June 23, 2015, 6:02 AM), 
http://bit.ly/1GlWG54. 
 34 See Going Dark Hearing, supra note 11, at 5. 
 35 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Obama Faces Growing Momentum to 
Support Widespread Encryption, Wash. Post (Sept. 16, 2015), http://wapo.st/20sbB8r; Kim 
Zetter, After Paris Attacks, Here’s What the CIA Director Gets Wrong About Encryption, 
WIRED (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://bit.ly/1LaK5d6. 
Robert S. Litt, general counsel in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
predicted as much in an email sent to colleagues three months ago. In that missive ob-
tained by the Washington Post, Litt argued that although “the legislative environment 
[for passing a law that forces decryption and backdoors] is very hostile today, it could 
turn in the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event where strong encryption can be 
shown to have hindered law enforcement.” 
Id. 
 36 Perlroth & Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Access, supra note 18. 
The Obama administration has backed down in its bitter dispute with Silicon Valley 
over the encryption of data on iPhones and other digital devices…While the admin-
istration said it would continue to try to persuade companies like Apple and Google to 
assist in criminal and national security investigations, it determined that the govern-
ment should not force them to breach the security of their products…”As the president 
has said, the United States will work to ensure that malicious actors can be held to ac-
count, without weakening our commitment to strong encryption,” said Mark Stroh, a 
spokesman for the National Security Council. “As part of those efforts, we are active-
ly engaged with private companies to ensure they understand the public safety and na-
tional security risks that result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products 
and services. However, the administration is not seeking legislation at this time.” 
Id. 
282 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
The two authors of this article both served as senior counterterrorism and 
national security officials for Presidents from different parties: Jamil Jaffer 
served in the White House and Justice Department during the George W. Bush 
Administration, and Daniel (DJ) Rosenthal served in the White House and Jus-
tice Department during the Barack Obama Administration. Each served Presi-
dents from different political parties; there are issues relating to national secu-
rity on which they disagree, including with regard to ways in which former 
President Bush sought to protect the nation from terrorism, and ways in which 
President Obama is currently seeking to do so. However, both authors firmly 
believe in the rule of law, and our nation’s sacred and enduring commitment to 
privacy and civil liberties even as we seek to address the relentless threats 
posed by terrorism. They have co-authored this article because both vigorously 
agree on the critical need for our government, privacy, and technology com-
munities to come together and act now to address the challenges posed by the 
current threat environment and shifting tactics, so that these authors are simul-
taneously not blind to the next terrorist attack on our homeland, and so that we 
can ensure that we preserve the huge privacy and economic benefits that we 
gain from ubiquitous strong encryption. 
It is important to note that this policy essay, due primarily to space con-
straints, does not purport to be a full recounting of all the legal or policy issues 
or debates at play in the encryption discussions. Rather, the essay seeks to 
highlight a few areas where there are particular challenges, where the law con-
tinues evolve, and where some reasonable options have been put on the table. 
Part I sets out some of the key content surveillance laws put in place after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, describes the current threat the nation 
faces, and the challenges that default-on, ubiquitous strong encryption poses 
for national security. Part II identifies the basic terms of the encryption debate. 
Part III describes a few aspects of the legal structures that have to be dealt with 
in the context of encryption. Part IV discusses a few key proposals that might 
usefully be considered as we seek to move forward on addressing these issues 
and Part V briefly summarizes our position on these matters—namely that se-
curity and privacy are best served by finding common ground on the encryp-
tion matter now, in the relative calm, rather than waiting to act in the aftermath 
of an attack when security will already have been sacrificed and privacy will 
pay a significant long term cost. 
PART I: KEY SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES, THE THREAT, AND 
THE CHALLENGES POSED BY ENCRYPTION 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, na-
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tional security professionals worked hard to identify and fill gaps that existed 
in their ability to gather critical national intelligence about terrorist actors op-
erating overseas.37 They quickly recognized that the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (“FISA”), 38 which Congress enacted in 1978 to govern electronic 
surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign intelligence pur-
poses, was unintentionally impeding national security investigations by requir-
ing a court order before the government could gain access to communications 
that are not entitled to constitutional protections—communications of non-U.S. 
persons overseas.39 Because Congress was focused, in enacting FISA, on pro-
tecting the rights of Americans in the United States, and primarily with respect 
to their domestic communications, it defined “electronic surveillance” in a par-
ticular manner by reference to the location of the parties to the communication, 
the location in which the acquisition occurred, and the physical transmission 
layer of the communication.40 In doing so, the drafters of FISA intended to in-
clude within its coverage key types of communications taking place within the 
                                                          
 37 See Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence Washington, D.C. (2012) (statement of Eric Belez-Villar, 
Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigations); The Post-
9/11 Era (September 2001 – present): Legislative Materials, LAWFARE (last visited Feb. 18, 
2016), http://bit.ly/1U8L8vD. 
 38 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1863 (2012)). 
 39 See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1331-33 (2004); see also Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, Privacy, Technology & National Security: Remarks at 
the Brookings Institution (July 18, 2013), http://bit.ly/1pbMJ8R (“As a result [of technolog-
ical advances], Congress’s original intention was frustrated; we were increasingly forced to 
go to the FISA Court to get individual warrants to conduct electronic surveillance of for-
eigners overseas for foreign intelligence purposes.”). 
 40 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101(f); Robert S. Litt, General 
Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Privacy, Technology & National 
Security: Remarks at the Brookings Institution (July 18, 2013), http://bit.ly/1pbMJ8R. 
 When FISA was first passed in 1978, Congress did not intend it to regulate the 
targeting of foreigners outside of the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. 
This kind of surveillance was generally carved out of coverage under FISA by the 
way Congress defined ‘electronic surveillance.’ Most international communications in 
1978 took place via satellite, so Congress excluded international radio communica-
tions from the definition of electronic surveillance covered by FISA, even when the 
radio waves were intercepted in the United States, unless the target of the collection 
was a U.S. person in the United States. Over time, that technology-based differentia-
tion fell apart. By the early twenty-first century, most international communications 
travelled over fiber optic cables and thus were no longer “radio communications” out-
side of FISA’s reach. 
Id.; see also Philip M. Bridwell & Jamil N. Jaffer, Updating the Counterterrorism Toolkit: A 
Brief Sampling of Post-9/11 Surveillance Laws and Authorities, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 
Spring 2011, at 19-20. 
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United States or acquired through certain methods inside the United States.41 
At the same time, Congress intentionally excluded a significant portion of the 
international communications traffic to and from the United States—traffic that 
took place over satellites when FISA was enacted—or what FISA referred to 
as “radio.”42 With the passage of time, however, this technology-based distinc-
tion evaporated, as fiber optic cables increasingly transmitted international 
communications, or “wire” in FISA parlance, and domestic calls made via 
cellphones, were increasing transmitted by wireless or “radio.” 43 
As a result of these changes in technology, communications that were never 
governed by FISA, and that Congress never intended to regulate under FISA, 
were subjected to its stringent rules, which required that the government seek a 
court order—under the same standard it must meet for U.S. persons—in its 
efforts to track terrorists overseas.44 This requirement hindered the govern-
ment’s ability to gain access to terrorist communications, often in fast-moving 
critical national security investigations.45 
To address this gap, the government initiated a program to target the com-
munications content of non-U.S. terrorists overseas without having to seek a 
court order.46 While there exists residual criticism about the means by which 
                                                          
 41 See id. at 18-20; Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is At Stake With The FISA 
Amendments Act Of 2008 And Ideas For Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
269, 278 (2009). 
 42 See Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 40, at 18-20; see also H. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt.1, at 
27 (1978) (“The committee has explored the feasibility of broadening this legislation to 
apply overseas, but has concluded that certain problems and unique characteristics involved 
in overseas surveillance preclude the simple extension of this bill to overseas surveil-
lances.”); S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt.1, at 34 (1977) (“The reason for excepting from the defini-
tion of electronic surveillance the acquisition of international radio transmissions, including 
international wire communications when acquired by intercepting radio transmissions, is to 
exempt from the procedures of this bill the signals intelligence activities of the National 
Security Agency.”). 
 43 Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and 
Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 148 (2015). 
 44 See Kate Poorbaugh, Security Protocol: A Procedural Analysis Of The Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2015). 
 45 Id. at 1373-77; L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Excep-
tion: Its History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1394-96 (2013); William J. Stuntz, 
Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2157-58 (2002). 
 46 STELLAR WIND Memorandum, supra note 5, at 7-8. 
[T]he President directed the Secretary of Defense to use the capabilities of the De-
partment of Defense, in particular the National Security Agency (NSA), to undertake 
a program of electronic surveillance designed to…countering the threat of further al 
Qaeda attacks within the United States….The electronic surveillance activities that the 
President authorized under STELLAR WIND…[included the] interception of the con-
tent of certain communications … the President noted that he had considered magni-
tude and probability of deaths and destruction that could result from further terrorist 
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the government first built this program in the immediate aftermath of Septem-
ber 11, 2001,47 Congress eventually expressly authorized the program in statute 
and subjected it to Article III judicial supervision, through passage of the Pro-
tect America Act in 2007 and subsequently the FISA Amendments Act in 
2008.48 This program–codified in Section 702 of FISA–has proven to be criti-
cal in the government’s counterterrorism efforts.49  Senior intelligence commu-
nity officials have repeatedly noted that collection under Section 702 is one of 
the most valuable counterterrorism tools available to the national security 
community, and Executive branch officials and members of Congress from 
both political parties have identified numerous instances in which collection 
under Section 702 has enabled the government to thwart what could have been 
significant terrorist attacks in the U.S. and abroad before they were executed.50 
                                                                                                                                      
attacks; the need to detect and prevent such attacks, particularly through effective 
electronic surveillance…Upon consideration of these factors, the President deter-
mined that…this emergency constituted…supported conducting the described surveil-
lance without resort to judicial warrants. 
Id.; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Spies, Secrets, And Security: The New Law of Intelligence: The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 
17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 531, 539 (2006). 
 47 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Brand, Eavesdropping on Our Founding Fathers: How a Return 
to the Republic’s Core Democratic Values Can Help Us Resolve the Surveillance Crisis, 6 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 42 (2015) (referring to a FISA court judge’s resignation in response 
to the “illegal” Stellar Wind program); David Husband, Who Decides? Drawing the Lines in 
the National Security Realm, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 245, 297 (2015) (arguing that the devel-
opment of the surveillance programs was secretive and “the American public was not 
brought on board.”). 
 48 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1863 (2000)); see also Poorbaugh, supra note 44, 
at 1375. 
 49 See Press Release, James R. Clapper, Director of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Statement 
on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (June 8, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1nsGiME (“Section 702 has proven vital to keep-
ing the nation and our allies safe. It continues to be one of our most important tools for the 
protection of the nation’s security.”); see also Letter from James R. Clapper & Eric H. 
Holder, Jr. to John Boehner, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, & Mitch McConnell, supra note 7, 
at 3. 
Section 702 is vital in keeping the nation safe. It provides information about the plans 
and identities of terrorists, allowing us to glimpse inside terrorist organizations and 
obtain information about how those groups function and receive support. In addition, 
it lets us collect information about the intentions and capabilities of weapons prolif-
erators and other foreign adversaries who threaten the United States. Failure to reau-
thorize section 702 would result in a loss of significant intelligence and impede the 
ability of the Intelligence Community to respond quickly to new threats and intelli-
gence opportunities. 
Id. 
 50 See Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA (Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) (statement of Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal 
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During the summer of 2013, news outlets released a number of stories based 
on documents they had received from former NSA contractor Edward Snow-
den that ostensibly detailed highly classified activities of the intelligence 
community, including the alleged means by which it obtains communications 
of terrorists overseas under Section 702 of FISA.51 While many of the stories 
had inaccuracies, material declassified by the government has since made it 
clear that significant aspects of the government’s collection architecture were 
revealed in the course of these leaks.52 
Almost immediately following the leaks, terrorists began changing their tac-
tics to evade detection.53 Among other things, according to FBI Director 
Comey, terrorists began using computer and mobile messaging applications 
that enabled them to encrypt their communications, which poses significant 
challenges to the ability of the law enforcement and national security commu-
nities to discover and disrupt terrorist plotting.54 Exacerbating the problem, 
after Snowden’s leak, leading technology companies have taken voluntary 
steps that make the government’s efforts to track terrorists more difficult.55 
                                                                                                                                      
Bureau of Investigation), http://1.usa.gov/222GIMO. 
 51 See Barton Gellman & Todd Lindeman, Inner Workings of a Top-Secret Spy Pro-
gram, WASH. POST (June 29, 2013), http://wapo.st/1QCHVmR (outlining how the PRISM 
program works); Gellman & Poitras, supra note 8. 
 52 See Press Release, Office of Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of 
Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (June 8, 
2013) (on file with author). 
 53 Barbara Starr, Terrorists Try Changes After Snowden Leaks, Official Says, CNN 
(June 25, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://cnn.it/1M3uh71 (“We can confirm we are seeing indica-
tions that several terrorist groups are in fact attempting to change their communications 
behaviors based specifically on what they are reading about our surveillance programs in the 
media.”). 
 54 Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter FBI Oversight Statement] (statement of 
James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
While some of the contacts between groups like ISIL and potential recruits occur in 
publicly accessible social networking sites, others take place via encrypted private 
messaging platforms. This real and growing gap, which the FBI refers to as ‘Going 
Dark,’ is an area of continuing focus for the FBI; we believe it must be addressed, 
since the resulting risks are grave both in both traditional criminal matters as well as 
in national security matters. 
Id.; Geoff Dyer & Barney Jopson, Encryption Harms Terror Probes, Says FBI, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://on.ft.com/1UOc0Sd. 
 55 Cyrus Farivar, Apple Expands Data Encryption Under iOS 8, Making Handover to 
Cops Moot, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 18, 2014, 12:57 AM), http://bit.ly/XL1tx9; Brad Smith, 
Protecting Customer Data from Government Snooping, MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1QyKRzC; Safer Email – Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://bit.ly/1Ypxy7L 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016); Pierluigi Paganini, IT Giants Google and Apple Enable Encryp-
tion by Default, SEC. AFFAIRS (Sept. 20, 2014), http://bit.ly/21TOtor; Leon Spencer, Android 
L Will Offer Default Encryption Just Like iOS 8, ZDNET (Sept. 19, 2014), 
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Many companies have publicly disclaimed any voluntary cooperation with 
government, legitimately fearing the public fallout, particularly in Europe, if 
they are viewed as being too close to the federal government.56 These compa-
nies have also taken affirmative steps to protect their users’ data through the 
implementation of strong encryption for data in transit, as well as data at rest.57 
Apple,58 for example, implemented default-on, strong encryption for data at 
rest on its devices.59  Indeed, prior to the release of iOS 8, Apple was able to 
use “a proprietary method to extract data from the device” to access and pro-
vide to the government content information stored on Apple devices in re-
sponse to court authorized warrants.60 In September 2014, Apple announced 
                                                                                                                                      
http://zd.net/1D8MN8s; Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering 
Default Encryption, Blocking Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://wapo.st/1nsj6hG. 
 56 Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger, & Michael S. Schmidt, Apple and Other Tech Com-
panies Tangle with U.S. Over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/21XfMuy. 
 57 Id; Sam Thielman, US and European Officials Reignite ‘Back Door’ Encryption De-
bate After Paris, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://bit.ly/1QH6BXY. For the 
purposes of this paper, “data at rest” means information stored on devices while “data in 
transit” or “data in motion” means information as it is being transferred from one source to 
another.  See Simon Liu & Rick Kuhn, Data Loss Prevention, IT PRO, March/April 2010, at 
10, 11-12 (“[D]ata at rest, meaning it resides in files systems, distributed desktops and large 
centralized data stores, databases, or other storage centers” and “data in motion, meaning it 
moves through the network to the outside world via email, instant messaging, peer-to-peer 
(P2P), FTP, or other communication mechanisms.”); see also MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 2. 
“Data at rest” is information that is stored on devices after the data-creating event has 
occurred. Data at rest could include, for example, a text message that has been re-
ceived by a smartphone and has not been deleted from the device….”Data in transit” 
refers to information in the very moment that it is being transferred from one source to 
another, for example, information communicated in a phone conversation is data in 
transit while it is being transferred. 
Id.; see also James Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a 
Collision Course?, Remarks Before the Brookings Institution. (Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
Comey, Brookings Institution Remarks], http://1.usa.gov/1ClnQNc. 
The first [challenge] concerns real-time court-ordered interception of what we call 
‘data in motion,’ such as phone calls, e-mail, and live chat sessions” and “court-
ordered access to data stored on our devices, such as e-mail, text messages, photos, 
and videos—or what we call ‘data at rest.’…[B]oth real-time communication and 
stored data are increasingly encrypted. 
Id.; While at rest, data may be stored, among other things, on a local device, on a network 
store, or at a service provider “in the cloud.” See Liu & Kuhn, supra note 57, at 12-13. 
 58 This note does not seek to address the arguments and relative merits of the govern-
ment’s efforts, in California and New York, to seek to compel Apple’s assistance in obtain-
ing access to data contained on encrypted iPhones. These matters are rapidly evolving and 
are being covered extensively elsewhere. 
 59 MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 1-3. 
 60 Id. at 4. 
With respect to the iPhone 4s and later models of iPhones and other Apple devices 
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that iOS 8 would automatically encrypt all data at rest on its device when 
locked such that information could only be accessed provided that the appro-
priate passcode was entered.61 With this change, and unlike prior versions of 
iOS, Apple is now unable to access data stored on its devices using this operat-
ing system, even if law enforcement provides Apple with a court-authorized 
warrant.62 Later versions of iOS have included the same capability enabled by 
                                                                                                                                      
running iOS versions through iOS 7…law enforcement requires the assistance of Ap-
ple to obtain the devices’ contents safely. The prosecutor or investigator obtains a 
search warrant and an order (often referred to as an “unlock order”) instructing Apple 
to assist with extracting data from the device. The prosecutor or investigator then 
sends Apple a copy of the warrant, the unlock order, the device, and a blank external 
hard drive. Apple uses a proprietary method to extract data from the device, and sends 
a copy of the data to law enforcement on the external hard drive. 
Id.; Kerr, Apple’s Dangerous Game, supra note 31. 
Under the old operating system, Apple could execute a lawful warrant and give law 
enforcement the data on the phone. Under the new operating system, that warrant is a 
nullity. It’s just a nice piece of paper with a judge’s signature. Because Apple de-
mands a warrant to decrypt a phone when it is capable of doing so, the only time Ap-
ple’s inability to do that makes a difference is when the government has a valid war-
rant. 
Id. 
 61 Privacy – Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://apple.co/1RPgqWe (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016). 
We build privacy into everything we make…. We’ve been protecting your data for 
over a decade with SSL and TLS in Safari, FileVault on Mac, and encryption that’s 
built into iOS. We also refuse to add a ‘backdoor’ into any of our products because 
that undermines the protections we’ve built in. And we can’t unlock your device for 
anyone because you hold the key — your unique password. We’re committed to using 
powerful encryption because you should know the data on your device and the infor-
mation you share with others is protected. 
Id.; Joe Miller, Google and Apple To Introduce Default Encryption, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2014), http://bbc.in/1sav1lF; Nate Raymond, Apple Tells U.S. Judge ‘Impossible’ To Unlock 
New Iphones, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://reut.rs/1LN5dpX. 
In court papers, Apple said that for the 90 percent of its devices running iOS 8 or 
higher, granting the Justice Department’s request ‘would be impossible to perform’ 
after it strengthened encryption methods. Those devices include a feature that prevents 
anyone without the device’s passcode from accessing its data, including Apple itself. 
The feature was adopted in 2014 amid heightened privacy concerns following leaks 
by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden about NSA surveil-
lance programs. 
Id. 
 62 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. 
For Apple devices running iOS 8, Apple can no longer comply with unlock orders. 
iOS 8 prevents Apple from accessing data on the device unless Apple has the user’s 
passcode. But, Apple does not keep users’ passcodes. Thus, it is no longer possible for 
Apple to extract data as it did for devices running prior operating systems. 
Id. 
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As a result, as of October 2015, the data at rest on approximately 91% of 
iPhones worldwide—a percentage that is incrementally increasing—is inacces-
sible to law enforcement, even with a court-authorized warrant.64 In the U.S. 
alone—which as of mid-2015 had an iPhone installed user base of approxi-
mately 94 million, a number that is increasing—more than 85 million devices 
from Apple alone are likely off limits to law enforcement.65 This doesn’t even 
account for the estimated 463 million iOS devices in use worldwide.66 
Google made a similar announcement with respect to data at rest on Android 
devices running Lollipop 5.0 or higher and, while implementation of default-
on encryption has been sporadic amongst Google partners due to performance 
issues on Lollipop 5.0 devices, Google’s own Nexus phones with Lollipop 5.0 
have default-on encryption enabled.67 With over one third of Android devices 
                                                          
 63 See Miller, supra note 61; see also Privacy – Our Approach to Privacy, supra note 
61. 
 64 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. (“According to Apple, as of 
October 19, 2015, approximately 61% of all Apple devices currently in use run iOS 9, and 
approximately 30% use iOS 8. Only nine percent use an earlier iOS version.”); see also App 
Store – Support – Apple Developer, APPLE, http://apple.co/1QH7a4a (last visited Jan. 11, 
2016) (noting that as of January 11, 2016, 94% of Apple devices worldwide use iOS 8 or 
higher). 
 65 See Press Release, Consumer Intelligence Research Partners, Significant iPhone 6, 6 
Plus Penetration in U.S. (May 15, 2015) (on file with author); see also Don Resinger, 
iPhones In Use in the US Rise to 94M, New Study Suggests, CNET (May 15, 2015, 10:18 
AM), http://cnet.co/1RxlMCW. 
 66 See Tomi T. Ahonen, Smartphone Wars: Q3 Scorecard - All Market Shares, Top 10 
Brands, OS Platforms, Installed Base, COMMUNITIES DOMINATE BRANDS BLOG (Oct. 30, 
2015, 4:36 AM), http://bit.ly/1TFI2Rq. 
 67 Kevin Tofel, Google Now Requires Full Device Encryption On New Android 6.0 
Devices, ZDNET (Oct. 19, 2015, 7:48 PM), http://zd.net/1U0j4M8; see also MANHATTAN 
D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 5. 
For Android devices running operating systems Lollipop 5.0 and above, however, 
Google plans to use default full-disk encryption, like that being used by Apple, that 
will make it impossible for Google to comply with search warrants and orders in-
structing them to assist with device data extraction. Full-disk encryption has not yet 
been implemented as a default on all Android devices running Lollipop 5.0 and later 
systems, but has been implemented on certain Nexus (Google-controlled) devices. 
Id.; Lucian Constatin, Google Requires Full-Disk Encryption and Secure Boot for Some 
Android 6.0 Devices, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 20, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://bit.ly/1M549Hn. 
With the release of Android 6.0, the Android Compatibility Definition Document 
(CDD)…now lists full-disk encryption as a requirement instead of a recommendation. 
If a device does not declare itself as a low-memory device—with about 512MB of 
RAM—and supports a secure lock screen, it must also support full-disk encryption of 
both the application data and shared storage partitions, the document says. Further-
more, if the device has an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic opera-
tion performance above 50MB/s, the full-disk encryption feature must be enabled by 
default during the initial set-up. 
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using Lollipop 5.0 or higher,68 and an installed base of 1.8 billion devices 
worldwide,69 Google’s implementation of this approach likewise significantly 
increases the challenge for law enforcement agencies seeking to use court-
authorized warrants to obtain content data from smartphones.70 Because people 
are continuing to increase their use of mobile devices, as opposed to traditional 
desktop or laptop computers, to communicate,71 this trend poses major chal-
lenges to law enforcement’s ability to conduct its investigations. 
PART II: TERMS OF THE DEBATE 
Given these trends, the change in tactics described earlier, and the fact that 
public key encryption is virtually unbreakable,72 the increased determination 
and ability of international terrorists to carry out attacks is a cause for signifi-
                                                                                                                                      
Id.; Timberg, supra note 55. 
 68 See Dashboards – Android Developers, GOOGLE (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://bit.ly/18oBxX9 (noting distribution rates of Lollipop 5.0 at 17%, Lollipop 5.1 at 
17.1%, and Marshmallow 6.0 at 1.2%). 
 69 See Ahonen, supra note 66; cf. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Tra-
ditional PC, Tablet, Ultramobile and Mobile Phone Shipments On Pace to Grow 7.6 Percent 
in 2014 (Jan. 7, 2014), http://gtnr.it/1eEJ08k (“Android holds the largest number of in-
stalled-base devices, with 1.9 billion in use in 2014, compared with 682 million iOS/Mac 
OS installed-base devices.”). 
 70 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 5. 
 71 MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RES. CTR., TECHNOLOGY DEVICE OWNERSHIP: 2015, at 3 
(2015), http://pewrsr.ch/1WarhLx (noting that smartphone ownership has increased 33 per-
centage points to 68% since 2011, while desktop and laptop ownership has stayed at ~72% 
since 2004). 
 72 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2016: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Justice, and Science of the H.R. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 115th Cong. 21 (2015) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation), http://1.usa.gov/1parFyR (“We have a huge problem for law enforce-
ment…and in national security work. We have court process, where judges issue search 
warrants or interception orders, and we are unable to execute on those orders because the 
device is locked or the communications are encrypted.”); Wittes, Going Dark: Part I, supra 
note 12 (quoting James B. Comey, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“[I]f we inter-
cept data in motion between two encrypted devices or across an encrypted mobile messag-
ing app and it’s strongly encrypted, we can’t break it.”); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Encryp-
tion, Biometrics, and the Status Quo Ante, LAWFARE (July 6, 2015, 10:29 AM) [hereinafter 
Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics], http://bit.ly/1R1rxYY. 
But there is a technological flip-side to the conversation that pro-encryption advocates 
too often disregard – the reality that properly implemented encryption is, for all prac-
tical purposes, uncrackable.”)The advent of public key encryption has, effectively 
changed the public policy dynamic – never before in human history have we seen a 
means of communication that was theoretically immune from government intercep-
tion and access…[P]ublic key encryption is, in theory, beyond mathematical analysis. 
It is impenetrable. That’s a real change. 
Id. 
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cant concern. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson has recently noted 
that “today the global terrorist threat is more decentralized, more complex, and 
in many respects harder to detect.”73 Government officials argue that wide-
spread adoption of encryption by terrorists worldwide could cripple the gov-
ernment’s ability to detect and disrupt terrorists, including those who intend to 
carry out attacks inside the United States.74 FBI Director James Comey has 
characterized the increasing challenge in detecting terrorist plots as a result of 
encryption—which he and other government officials refer to as “going 
dark”—as posing a “grave” and “growing” threat to national security.75 Comey 
has also noted that while the FBI is tirelessly working to identify individuals 
who seek to join ISIS as well as “homegrown violent extremists who may as-
pire to attack the United States from within,”76 terrorists’ increasing use of en-
cryption “poses real barriers” to its ability to gather critical information neces-
sary to thwart the next attack.77 
For example, Comey has said that 109 text messages between the Garland 
shooters and overseas terrorists remain inaccessible due to the use of encryp-
tion78 and has testified that the use of encrypted communications is now stand-
ard “terrorist tradecraft.”79 In particular, Comey has warned of the potential 
threat to the homeland posed by homegrown extremists recruited by ISIS 
                                                          
 73 Threats to the Homeland, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affs., 114th Cong. (2015) (written statement of Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department of 
Homeland Security), http://1.usa.gov/1R1rAUu. 
 74 Alina Selyukh & Steve Henn, After Paris Attack, Encrypted Communication Is Back 
In Spotlight, NPR (Nov. 6, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://n.pr/1l0OSBr (quoting New York Police 
Commissioner Bill Bratton as saying that it is a very significant negative effect on our abil-
ity to detect and disrupt terrorist activity). 
 75 Threats to the Homeland, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affs., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation), http://1.usa.gov/1OXWQTe. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Going Dark Hearing, supra note 11, at 9-10. 
 78 161 Cong. Rec S8,664 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2015) (statement of James B. Comey, Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation), http://1.usa.gov/22fvwZM; Pierre Thomas, Feds 
Challenged by Encrypted Devices of San Bernardino Attackers, ABC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 
6:04 PM), http://abcn.ws/1Ncu7wq (“‘There’s no doubt that use of encryption is part of 
terrorist tradecraft now,’ Comey told the Senate Judiciary Committee. ‘Increasingly, we are 
unable to see what they say, which gives them a tremendous advantage against us.’”); Mela-
nie Hunter, FBI Director: Terrorist in Texas Attack Sent 109 Encrypted Messages on Morn-
ing of Attack to Terrorist Overseas, CNS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://bit.ly/1QH7IH2 (“‘We have no idea what he said,’ Comey said about one of the gun-
men, ‘because those messages were encrypted, and to this day, I can’t tell you what he said 
with that terrorist 109 times the morning of that attack. That is a big problem. We have to 
grapple with it…’”). 
 79 See Thomas, supra note 78; see also Jonathan Alter, Manhattan DA: Smartphone 
Encryption Foiled 120 Criminal Cases, The DAILY BEAST (Dec. 28, 2015, 12:13 AM), 
http://thebea.st/1p3hs7o. 
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online who may be using encrypted means to communicate with ISIS recruiters 
and operatives overseas.80 Comey argues that the FBI’s “job is to find needles 
in a nationwide haystack, needles that are increasingly invisible to us because 
of end-to-end encryption” and that because ““we don’t have the capability we 
need,” this really represents “the ‘going dark’ problem in high definition.”81 
Perhaps most importantly, as Ben Wittes, co-founder of the Lawfare Blog, 
points out, “[a]s a practical matter, that means there are people in the United 
States whom authorities reasonably believe to be in contact with ISIS for 
whom surveillance is lawful and appropriate but for whom useful signals inter-
ception is not technically feasible.”82 
The President himself has highlighted the distinct nature of the terrorism 
challenge and the need to balance priorities. Specifically, the President recently 
noted: 
If we get into a situation which the technologies do not allow us at all to track some-
body we’re confident is a terrorist…and despite knowing that information, despite 
having a phone number or a social-media address or email address, that we can’t pen-
etrate that, that’s a problem.83 
The problem is not limited to terrorism. Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus 
Vance recently suggested that “more than 120 Manhattan criminal cases have 
been harmed by the failure to execute search warrants on the latest 
smartphones.”84 Vance also notes that criminals incarcerated at New York’s 
Rikers Island prison often counsel their colleagues outside of the prison to use 
current-era iPhones because of the at-rest encryption they employ.85 Vance 
extends this argument to the national security and cyber realms, arguing that 
“[i]f the average criminal at Rikers knows it, the terrorist knows it, the sophis-
                                                          
 80 See FBI Oversight Statement, supra note 54; see also Steven Melendez, FBI Renews 
Warnings on Terror and Encryption, with No Clear Solution in Sight, FAST CO. (Dec. 14, 
2015, 12:15 PM), http://bit.ly/1NVlYxT. 
 81 See Theodore Schleifer, FBI Director: We Can’t Yet Restrain ISIS On Social Media, 
CNN (June 18, 2015, 3:19 PM) (quoting James Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gations), http://cnn.it/21hSWM1. 
 82 Ben Wittes, Jim Comey, ISIS, and “Going Dark,” LAWFARE (July 1, 2015, 5:17 PM), 
http://bit.ly/1puEHYy. 
 83 Cody M. Poplin, President Obama Comments on Back-doors in Encryption, LAW-
FARE (Jan. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://bit.ly/1nsk5P1 (“[The President] continued by not[ing] 
the difficult and sometime tenuous balance between security, liberty, and privacy, and stated 
that debate with civil libertarians and privacy groups had been “useful.”). 
 84 See Alter, supra note 79; see also MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 
(noting that between mid-September 2014 and mid-October 2015, “the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office was unable to execute approximately 111 search warrants for 
smartphones because those devices were running iOS 8. The cases to which those devices 
related include homicide, attempted murder, sexual abuse of a child, sex trafficking, assault, 
and robbery.”). 
 85 See Alter, supra note 79. 
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ticated cyber-criminal knows it.”86 But Vance doesn’t stop there—he further 
argues that “[i]t’s only a matter of time before there’s an incident where we 
say, ‘Who gave [Apple CEO] Tim Cook the right to decide whether a parent 
can find a lost child?’”87 
Many in the government—and former government officials on the outside—
place a significant amount of the blame for the current challenges on American 
technology companies like Apple and Google that, as described above, have 
begun implementing not only strong encryption on their devices, but have done 
so in default-on mode, and, in the case of Apple, have done so in a manner that 
(unlike in prior versions which also provided for strong data encryption) en-
sures data are no longer accessible to any party other than the end user, includ-
ing the manufacturer itself.88 Indeed, many have argued that the real problem 
for the government stems less from the increasingly widespread availability of 
strong encryption itself and more from the shift by technology companies to 
make this capability available in “default-on” mode, which some have suggest-
ed—albeit without any actual testable data—could put 80-90% of data at rest 
in an encrypted and (ostensibly) warrant-proof state.89 The more aggressive 
form of this argument from government officials—designed to undermine the 
widely employed rejoinder from technology companies, technologists, and 
privacy advocates that providing lawful access to encrypted content would re-
quire introducing unnecessary and damaging vulnerabilities to existing prod-
                                                          
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See, e.g., Going Dark Hearing, supra note 11, at 3. 
In recent months, however, we have on a new scale seen mainstream products and 
services designed in a way that gives users sole control over access to their data. As a 
result, law enforcement is sometimes unable to recover the content of electronic 
communications from the technology provider even in response to a court order or du-
ly-authorized warrant issued by a Federal judge. For example, many communications 
services now encrypt certain communications by default, with the key necessary to 
decrypt the communications solely in the hands of the end user. 
Id. 
 89 See Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72. 
The significance of the change that we are seeing is NOT in the development of pub-
lic key encryption…Rather, the change is in the default rule – it is the difference be-
tween having encryption always ‘off’ as a default rule (such that people need to turn it 
on to be effective) and always ‘on’ (such that it works unless you turn it off). I have 
no data on how that change will affect government access to evidence of criminality, 
but my guess is that a default “on” rule will, once implemented and transitioned, put 
something on the order of 80-90% of data stored at rest in an encrypted state. 
Id.; MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing the Apple and Google an-
nouncements in 2014 regarding encryption in their product offerings, noting that “[t]he sig-
nificance of the companies’ change in practice was that this type of encryption would be the 
default setting on their new devices.”). 
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ucts and services90—is that key companies have long possessed access to oth-
erwise encrypted communications (in the case of Apple all the way until iOS 8 
was released in September 2014) and many maintain such access as part of 
their business model (e.g., Google in the case of email content which it exam-
ines in order to push targeted ads to its customers) and yet none of these com-
panies have suggested—until recently—that such provider access to such data 
introduces massive new vulnerabilities.91 
As the debate over encryption has come to the fore once again, a wide range 
of civil society organization, advocacy groups, technology companies, trade 
associations, and security and policy experts have argued strongly against “any 
proposal that U.S. companies deliberately weaken the security of their prod-
ucts,” urging the White House to “focus [instead] on developing policies that 
will promote rather than undermine the wide adoption of strong encryption 
technology.”92 These advocates correctly note that “[s]trong encryption is the 
cornerstone of the modern information economy’s security” protecting con-
sumers against fraud, companies against IP theft, and governments against for-
eign spies.93 
The advocacy groups argue that the “mandatory insertion of any new vul-
nerabilities into encrypted devices and services” regardless of whether they are 
called front- or backdoors, “will make those products less secure against other 
attackers” and “would also seriously undermine our economic securi-
ty…[because this] would further push many customers—be they domestic or 
international, individual or institutional—to turn away from those compro-
                                                          
 90 See, e.g., HAROLD ABLESON ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026, 
KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO 
ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 2 (2015), http://bit.ly/1p3r16c. 
[B]uilding in exceptional access would substantially increase system complexity. Se-
curity researchers inside and outside government agree that complexity is the enemy 
of security — every new feature can interact with others to create vulnerabilities. To 
achieve widespread exceptional access, new technology features would have to be de-
ployed and tested with literally hundreds of thousands of developers all around the 
world….Features to permit law enforcement exceptional access across a wide range of 
Internet and mobile computing applications could be particularly problematic because 
their typical use would be surreptitious — making security testing difficult and less 
effective. 
Id. 
 91 See LISA GEVELBER, GOOGLE, THE SHIFT TO CONSTANT CONNECTIVITY 3 (2013), 
http://bit.ly/1QCSeHH; NATE CARDOZO, KURT OPSAHL & RAINEY REITMAN, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT DATA RE-
QUESTS 12 (2015), http://bit.ly/1puEPHl. 
 92 Letter from Civil Society Organizations, Companies and Trade Associations & Secu-
rity and Policy Experts to President Barack Obama 1 (May 19, 2015), http://bit.ly/1IO8H77. 
 93 Id. 
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mised products and services.”94 The advocacy groups also question the benefits 
of requiring domestic providers to implement a lawful access program, point-
ing out that, rather than using government-accessible products from U.S. pro-
viders, bad actors will likely turn to foreign providers or use the wide variety 
of unregulated free and open source products available online to protect the 
privacy of their communications.95 Finally, the groups note that any lawful ac-
cess program required domestically could have the perverse effect of under-
mining human rights and democracy promotion efforts globally because oth-
er—less free—governments will be emboldened to seek similar access and the 
United States will be hard pressed to oppose such measures, having ceded the 
moral high ground and requiring such access domestically.96  Such views are 
not limited to technology companies and advocates. The recent expert review 
panel convened by the President in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures 
unanimously recommended the same thing: arguing that the U.S. Government 
should: 
(1) fully support[] and not undermin[e] efforts to create encryption standards; (2) 
mak[e] clear that it will not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnera-
ble generally available commercial software; and (3) support[] efforts to encourage 
the greater use of encryption technology for data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in 
storage.97 
Moreover, former senior Bush Administration officials, including former 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, DNI Michael McConnell, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, and Former CIA Director Gen. Mi-
chael V. Hayden—rarely shy on national security matters—have made similar 
arguments.98 
                                                          
 94 Id. at 1-2. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See PRESIDENT’S REV. GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMM’CNS TECH., LIBERTY AND SE-
CURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 22 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1bK0q7x. 
 98 See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Michael Chertoff, and William Lynn, Why the Fear 
Over Ubiquitous Data Encryption Is Overblown, WASH. POST (July 28, 2015), 
http://wapo.st/1ShCPic. 
We recognize the importance our officials attach to being able to decrypt a coded 
communication under a warrant or similar legal authority. But the issue that has not 
been addressed is the competing priorities that support the companies’ resistance to 
building in a back door or duplicated key for decryption. We believe that the greater 
public good is a secure communications infrastructure protected by ubiquitous encryp-
tion at the device, server and enterprise level without building in means for govern-
ment monitoring. 
Id.; Jose Pagliery, Ex-NSA Boss Says FBI Director Is Wrong On Encryption, CNN (Jan. 13, 
2016, 9:43 AM), http://cnnmon.ie/1nskmBp (statement of Gen. Hayden) (“I disagree with 
[FBI director] Jim Comey…I actually think end-to-end encryption is good for America…I 
know encryption represents a particular challenge for the FBI…[b]ut on balance, I actually 
think it creates greater security for the American nation than the alternative: a backdoor.”); 
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Some have directly challenged the government’s claim that it is “going 
dark.” For example, a paper from Harvard’s Berkman Center, co-authored by a 
number of prominent academics, practitioners, and technologists from varied 
backgrounds, takes issue with the notion that the government is going com-
pletely black—that is to say to entirely lose huge swaths of communications 
due to encryption.99 In truth, the challenge the government faces is two-fold: 
first, the use of strong encryption by bad actors certainly creates new shadows 
and gaps where law enforcement will face more significant challenges if no 
forward progress is made on addressing lawful access to ciphertext, and se-
cond, when big providers start implementing strong encryption across the 
board and in a default-on mode, it simply makes potentially illicit uses that 
much harder to find as it allows bad actors to hide amongst the noise. This is 
not to suggest that ubiquitous strong encryption is not a net good, it is, but one 
must take into account that it does make the government’s job that much hard-
er. At the same time, however, the Berkman authors are also correct to point 
out that even as encryption may create new shadows and make the govern-
ment’s work harder at the margins, the velocity and nature of technological 
change and the integration of networked devices into entirely new areas of 
people’s lives.100 This of course includes the expansion of the vaunted Internet 
of Things (“IoT”), meaning that entirely new data flows soon will be opening 
up to law enforcement, thereby mitigating any loss from the expansion of en-
crypted communications.101 The question of relative gains versus losses, of 
course, is an empirical one and a matter that neither the Berkman authors nor 
we propose to solve here. Rather, these are simply important issues to flag as 
we move forward and which highlight the fact that simple, formulaic state-
ments like encryption is making the government “go dark” or seeking to ad-
dress the challenge encryption poses to lawful access means “breaking the in-
ternet” or “sacrificing all security” are likely to muddy, rather than clarify the 
very real policy issues that require debate and discussion if we are to find a 
stable, sensible equilibrium. 
At the same time, however, it is important to note that at least part of the 
Berkman authors’ theory also faces some not unreasonable empirical challeng-
es. For example, the Berkman authors argue that expanded access to data in the 
cloud and an expanded set of (presumably unencrypted) endpoints can make 
up for much of the data that might be lost as a result of key endpoints—like 
                                                                                                                                      
see also Brad Reed, Ex-NSA Chief Defends End-to-End Encryption, Says ‘Backdoors’ Will 
Make Us Less Secure, BGR (Jan. 13, 2016, 12:57 PM), http://bit.ly/21hTjpI. 
 99 MATT OLSON, BRUCE SCHNEIER & JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, DON’T PANIC: MAKING PRO-
GRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 2 (2016), http://bit.ly/1P0L1yW. 
 100 Id. at 3. 
 101 Id. 
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smartphones—employing default-on strong encryption.102 The Manhattan Dis-
trict Attorney’s office has challenged a key part of this claim head on, arguing 
that access to other sources, like iCloud or Google’s data stores, does not fully 
compensate for a lack of access to encrypted smartphones.103 Specifically, they 
argue that access to key types of data that would be found on a, iPhone, such as 
iMessage, SMS, certain cell tower related data, and third party app data simply 
aren’t available on iCloud.104 
On the other hand, the Manhattan District Attorney’s report is also notable 
for what it highlights with respect to Google’s cloud and server storage, which 
is that while many of the types of data available on an Android smartphone are 
not always going to be available in the Google Cloud, there is at least some 
opportunity for nearly all of the data to be available there.105 The Manhattan 
District Attorney’s report also notes that much of the data on a smartphone 
may not be available from the phone company.106 Of course that’s not surpris-
ing since one generally expects a telecommunications provider to principally 
provide data or content transport, not storage, and, to the extent it keeps any 
data, its likely to keep data relevant to the communications being transported, 
such as routing information and other such metadata.107 While the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s report argues, among other things, that “[e]ven under the 
best of circumstances, the cloud does not have all of the information that 
would be available on a personal device,” that diversity and competition in the 
cloud storage space makes law enforcement’s efforts more difficult, and that 
deleted data may not be recoverable from the cloud whereas it may be availa-
ble on devices, the arguments simply aren’t as robust as one might expect.108 
As such, while the Manhattan District Attorney’s report takes a good shot at 
undermining the Berkman paper’s argument at least as to iPhones, it really also 
serves to underline one of the Berkman paper’s key findings which is—at least 
for providers who make money by accessing a significant measure of user in-
formation and content, like Google—encryption, particularly of data at rest, 
may be mitigated by ensuring lawful access to the same data that the company 
has access to for its own business purposes.109 
Given these basic terms of the debate, it is also worth understanding the cur-
                                                          
 102 Id. at 9. 
 103 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-8. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing cell phone subscribers are aware that service providers use and collect their location data 
in order to connect their calls and for other billing and business records). 
 108 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 8. 
 109 OLSON ET AL., supra note 99, at 10-12. 
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rent state of the law as it relates to some of these issues, particularly given that 
some of the recommendations currently under consideration or discussed in 
this paper would require changes in the law (and, after all, this is a law journal 
article). 
PART III: LEGAL STRUCTURES 
The examination of a few key legal structures relevant to the encryption de-
bate focuses on a couple of the methods by which the government might con-
ceivably access data stored on a smartphone or computer or in transit: (1) ob-
taining the access code to the device or the passphrase for the private key to the 
encryption being employed in the stored or transiting communication;110 and 
(2) requiring the provider to build in a capability for the government, with 
technical assistance from the provider, to obtain lawful access to the content of 
communications.111 Unfortunately for the government (and fortunately for 
those who support protection from government access), currently both of these 
avenues remain fairly challenging for the government. 
With respect to simply obtaining access to the data from the end user by re-
quiring them to provide access, the challenge, as Paul Rosenzweig has wisely 
pointed out, is that there is “growing body of [constitutional] law that protects 
encryption passwords against compulsory disclosure.”112 These cases, such as 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, make it diffi-
cult for law enforcement to decrypt data stored at rest even if authorities have 
lawfully seized the storage device and placed the suspect in custody, because 
they afford defendants a constitutional privilege, grounded in the Fifth 
Amendment’s right against compelled self-incrimination, to not reveal pass-
phrase to the private key or otherwise undertake decryption efforts when the 
government seeks compelled access to the underlying encrypted data.113  In that 
case, as with others in various jurisdictions,114 a panel of the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                          
 110 See Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72. 
 111 Sam Thielman, FBI Head: Terror Fight Requires Open Backdoors to Encrypted User 
Data, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://bit.ly/1XXa65e. 
 112 See Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72; see also generally Paul 
Rosenzweig, Encryption Keys and Surveillance, LAWFARE (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:00 PM) [herein-
after Rosenzweig, Encryption Keys], http://bit.ly/24SVKpS (explaining generally how 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment case law as interpreted issues relating to encryption). 
 113 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 114 See, e.g., id.; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Huang, No. CV 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644, 
at*2-4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2015).  
“We find, as the SEC is not seeking business records but Defendants’ personal 
thought processes, Defendants may properly invoke their Fifth Amendment 
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held that the mandated decryption would be tantamount to compelled testimo-
ny because, like the required production of a defendant’s knowledge of a com-
bination to a safe—which the Supreme Court has strongly suggested is uncon-
stitutional115—requiring decryption “use[s] [] the contents of [the defendant’s] 
mind and…would be tantamount to testimony by [the defendant] of his 
knowledge of the existence and location of potentially incriminating files; of 
his possession, control, and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and 
of his capability to decrypt the files.”116 
While there are admittedly some outs to this trick-box for the government—
arguing, for example, that the existence of information sought by the govern-
                                                                                                                                      
right…The SEC argues any incriminating testimonial aspect to Defendants’ produc-
tion of the their personal passcodes already is a foregone conclusion because it can 
show Defendants were the sole users and possessors of their respective work-issued 
phones…SEC does not show the ‘existence’ of any requested documents actually ex-
isting on the smartphones. Merely possessing the smartphones is insufficient if the 
SEC cannot show what is actually on the device…Thus, the foregone conclusion doc-
trine is not applicable.” 
Id.; United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
“In this case, the government is not seeking documents or objects—it is seeking testi-
mony from the Defendant, requiring him to divulge through his mental processes his 
password—that will be used to incriminate him…Accordingly, the Court quashes the 
subpoena requiring Defendant to testify—giving up his password—thereby protecting 
his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.” 
Id. 
 115 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n. 9 (1988). 
We do not disagree with the dissent that ‘[t]he expression of the contents of an indi-
vidual’s mind’ is testimonial communication for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment...We simply disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the execution of the con-
sent directive at issue here forced petitioner to express the contents of his mind. In our 
view, such compulsion is more like ‘be[ing] forced to surrender a key to a strongbox 
containing incriminating documents’ than it is like ‘be[ing] compelled to reveal the 
combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.’ 
Id. (internal citations omitted); Id. at 219 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence that is incriminating. Fin-
gerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars, handwriting specimens, or other items of 
physical evidence may be extracted from a defendant against his will. But can he be 
compelled to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I 
think not. He may in some cases be forced to surrender a key to a strongbox contain-
ing incriminating documents, but I do not believe he can be compelled to reveal the 
combination to his wall safe—by word or deed. 
Id.; see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (holding the derivative use of 
produced documents unconstitutional because “[i]t was unquestionably necessary for re-
spondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hun-
dreds of documents” similar to “telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like 
being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.”). 
 116 See In re 2011 Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
300 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
ment was a “foregone conclusion”—cases like In re: 2011 Grand Jury Sub-
poena make clear that these solutions are narrow at best.117 For example, in that 
case, the court determined that the government had not shown, nor argued that 
it knew whether the drives actually held any file nor that it knew, “with rea-
sonable particularity[,] that [the defendant] is even capable of accessing the 
encrypted portions of the drives.”118 As a result, the court held that the govern-
ment had not sustained its burden to show that the encrypted files actually ex-
isted, that the defendant had ongoing access to the evidence, nor could the 
government describe the evidence with reasonable particularity; therefore, the 
court held that the Fifth Amendment protected the defendant from having to 
decrypt the files for the government and reversed the district court’s finding of 
contempt.119 
Not all cases have turned out quite so poorly for the government, however. 
For example, In re Boucher, the government sought to compel a suspect to 
produce an unencrypted version of a drive on his laptop that was suspected to 
contain child pornography.120 The judge denied the defendant’s motion to sup-
press the subpoena based the fact that the government had previously inspected 
the relevant drive with the defendant’s assistance and had determined that at 
least some of the files appeared to contain child pornography based on the con-
tents of other file and the file names.121 This, combined with the fact that the 
defendant had admitted to possession of the computer led the judge to deter-
mine that the government “thus [knew] of the existence and location of the Z 
drive and its files…[and] providing access to the unencrypted Z drive ‘adds 
little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information’ about the 
existence and location of files that may contain incriminating information.”122 
Other cases have, on occasion, suggested similar results, some even more fa-
vorable to the government.123 At the end of the day, however, the weight of 
                                                          
 117 Id. at 1346-53. 
 118 See id. at 1346. 
 119 See id. at 1346-53. 
 120 See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3 (D.Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 121 See Id. at *3-4. 
 122 Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). 
 123 See, e.g., United States v. Gavegnano, 305 F. App’x. 954, 956 (4th Cir. 2009). 
“Gavegnano’s Fifth Amendment claim, based on the fact that, after invoking his right 
to consult with an attorney, he was asked for, and revealed, the password to the com-
puter, also fails. Any self-incriminating testimony that he may have provided by re-
vealing the password was already a ‘foregone conclusion’ because the Government 
independently proved that Gavegnano was the sole user and possessor of the comput-
er.” 
Id.; but see Huang, 2015 WL 5611644, at *3 (seeking to distinguish Gavegnano on the basis 
that “the Government could independently verify the defendant was the sole user and that he 
accessed child pornography websites because the computer was monitored for all activity.”); 
2016] Decrypting Our Security 301 
authority currently cuts strongly against the government being able to access to 
encrypted data even with a lawful court order due to the testimonial privilege, 
and those few cases in which the government has compelled production of a 
passcode are predicated on narrow exceptions that are unlikely to apply in the 
majority of cases, particularly fast-moving terrorism investigations.124 
                                                                                                                                      
see also Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 614-16 (2014). 
[W]e conclude that the factual statements that would be conveyed by the defendant’s 
act of entering an encryption key in the computers are ‘foregone conclusions’ and, 
therefore, the act of decryption is not a testimonial communication that is protected by 
the Fifth Amendment…When considering the entirety of the defendant’s interview 
with Trooper Johnson, it is apparent that the defendant was engaged in real estate 
transactions involving Baylor Holdings, that he used his computers to allegedly com-
municate with its purported owners, that the information on all of his computers per-
taining to these transactions was encrypted, and that he had the ability to decrypt the 
files and documents. The facts that would be conveyed by the defendant through his 
act of decryption—his ownership and control of the computers and their contents, 
knowledge of the fact of encryption, and knowledge of the encryption key—already 
are known to the government and, thus, are a ‘foregone conclusion.’…The Common-
wealth’s motion to compel decryption does not violate the defendant’s rights under 
the Fifth Amendment because the defendant is only telling the government what it al-
ready knows. 
Id. 
 124 While the court in Huang distinguishes Gavegnano on the basis that an earlier part of 
the opinion in that case noted that Gavegnano was aware that the government was monitor-
ing all traffic, it is far from clear that the court in Gavegnano relied on that fact to determine 
the applicability of the foregone conclusion doctrine. Indeed, to the contrary, the Fourth 
Circuit’s citation to its earlier precedent in United States v. Stone, a case applying the fore-
gone conclusion doctrine to utility bills belonging to a homeowner, militates in the opposite 
direction and suggests that, contrary to the holding in Huang, the Fourth Circuit may be 
willing to accept a government demonstration that an individual is the sole user and posses-
sor of a given device in applying the foregone conclusion doctrine. See Huang, 2015 WL 
5611644, at *3; see United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909, 911-12 (4th Cir.1992); see also 
Gavegnano, 305 F. App’x at 956. At the same time, however, it is likely that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding in In re: 2011 Grand Jury Subpoena and its reading of Hubbell as requir-
ing government knowledge of some aspect of the evidence on a given device, rather than 
mere knowledge of sole possession and control of a device, is a more accurate reading of the 
case law as it stands today. See In re: 2011 Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346-53; see 
also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35-36. As a result, it will be fairly difficult for the government to 
prevail other than in unique circumstances like those in In re: Boucher. See In re Boucher, 
No. 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Note, however, that Prof. 
Orin Kerr has suggested for over a year now that another way out of this box for the gov-
ernment is to seek an order requiring a user to type in a password or passphrase, rather than 
provide the password or passphrase to the government. See Orin Kerr, A Revised Approach 
To the Fifth Amendment and Obtaining Passcodes, WASH. POST. (Sept. 25, 2015) 
http://wapo.st/1TFJUJO. 
[W]hen the government seeks a subpoena or order requiring the suspects to enter in 
their passcodes in a way that will unlock the phones…the government is seeking an 
act instead of testimony. The foregone conclusion doctrine should be satisfied and the 
order allowed when the government already knows that the person possessed the 
phone. 
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While it is true, as Rosenzweig points out, that the government may have 
other means to access such data, citing “black bag jobs” and espionage as two 
examples, he also correctly notes that putting encrypted data off limits from 
lawful court orders certainly serves to “weaken[] judicial control of law en-
forcement.”125 This, of course, is hardly a good result for those, like the fram-
ers, who believe the involvement of a neutral third party with life tenure is a 
foundational check on government action that serves as a robust protection for 
privacy. 
Similar challenges exist with regard to government efforts to compel certain 
companies to provide government with the capability to access to the plaintext 
of their customer’s encrypted data. As FBI Director Comey and Deputy Attor-
ney General Sally Yates recently noted in joint testimony, the government 
faced a similar issue in the early 1990s with respect to wireline telephony tap-
ping capabilities.126 In response to that challenge, in 1994, Congress enacted 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), which 
requires “telecommunications carriers” to provide capabilities that allow the 
Government to intercept electronic communications—both content and 
metadata—when authorized by court order or other lawful process.127 
At the same time, however, CALEA “does not require a carrier to decrypt 
communications encrypted by the customer unless the carrier provided the en-
cryption and possesses the information necessary to decrypt.”128 Moreover, 
CALEA’s historic focus on telecommunication carriers has meant that CALEA 
does not even reach “popular Internet-based communications services such as 
                                                                                                                                      
Id.; Orin Kerr, Virginia State Trial Court Ruling On the Fifth Amendment and Smart 
Phones, WASH. POST. (Nov. 3, 2014) http://wapo.st/21Xi7ph. 
Because the passcode itself could be incriminating, the smart way to limit the Fifth 
Amendment problem is for the government to ask for an order compelling the target 
to enter in the passcode rather than to divulge it to the police….If the defendant has to 
enter in the passcode rather than tell it to the police, the testimonial aspect of comply-
ing would only be admitting knowledge of the passcode, which would very likely be a 
foregone conclusion in a case where the phone is used heavily by that person. 
Id. 
 125 See Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72. 
 126 See Going Dark Hearing, supra note 11, at 8. 
In the early 1990s, the telecommunications industry was undergoing a major trans-
formation and the Government faced a similar problem: determining how best to en-
sure that law enforcement could reliably obtain evidence from emerging telecommu-
nications networks. At that time, law enforcement agencies were experiencing a re-
duced ability to conduct intercepts of mobile voice communications as digital, switch-
based telecommunications services grew in popularity. 
Id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. 
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email, Internet messaging, social networking sites, or peer-to-peer services,” 
even though, over time, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
has extended CALEA’s coverage “to include facilities-based broadband Inter-
net access and Voice over Internet Protocol ([“]VoIP[“]) services that are fully 
interconnected with the public switched telephone network.”129 As a result, 
Comey and Yates argue, “the Government has lost ground in its ability to exe-
cute court orders with respect to Internet-based communications that are not 
covered by CALEA,”130 which means that thousands of companies providing 
communications services are simply not covered by CALEA’s requirements 
and, for such companies, “an order from a judge to monitor a suspect’s com-
munication may amount to nothing more than a piece of paper.”131 
This also means there is little incentive for voluntary cooperation—even if 
the major new technology companies, like Apple and Google, were even will-
ing to provide it (which they are not). As Ben Wittes summarizes it: 
The core of that emergent problem…is that CALEA—which mandates that 
telecommunications providers retain the capacity for law enforcement to 
get access to signal for lawful wiretapping—does not reach internet companies. 
So even if Apple and Google were to voluntarily retain encryption keys, some 
other actor would very likely not do so. Absent a legal requirement that com-
panies refrain from making true end-to-end encrypted services available with-
out a CALEA-like stop-gap, some entity will see a market hole and provide 
those services.132 
To address these problems, FBI Director Comey has previously argued for 
“a regulatory or legislative fix to create a level playing field, so that all com-
munication service providers are held to the same standard.”133 As we know, 
however, at this time, the White House has determined that the better path for-
ward is not to seek legislative or regulatory authority but rather to work coop-
eratively with companies in the technology sector to determine whether other, 
voluntary solutions can effectively address the government’s needs.134 
PART IV: POTENTIAL PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION 
Having set out our basic arguments for why addressing this issue now is 
critically important, and having identified the key arguments on both sides of 
the encryption debate, along with some of the key legal issues, we seek to 
demonstrate to the reader that there actually some rational proposals out there 
                                                          
 129 Id. at 8-9. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Comey, Brookings Institution Remarks, supra note 57. 
 132 Wittes, Going Dark: Part I, supra note 12. 
 133 Comey, Brookings Institution Remarks, supra note 57. 
 134 Perlroth & Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Access, supra note 18. 
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worth considering in the effort to find a middle ground. The goal in setting out 
the options below is not to support one proposal over another or to suggest that 
any one of these proposals is actually worth implementing. Rather, our goal is 
simply to demonstrate that even though each of these proposal is likely to be 
(or already has been) subject to a great deal of criticism from one side or the 
other, the fact that there are proposals that seek to bridge the gap between the 
two sides suggest that additional effort would be beneficial to further explore 
these proposals, and develop new ones, in search for a reasonable compromise. 
As we have previously suggested in this essay, our concern with the debate on 
these issues thus far is the absolutism and polarization in the arguments on 
both sides, which suggests an inflexibility and inability to reach an optimal 
outcome. Our concern, to make the core point yet once again, is that this dy-
namic, for which both sides deserve significant criticism, will almost certainly 
lead, in the long run, to an outcome that is both bad for national security and 
(particularly) bad for privacy and civil liberties in the long run. As a result, 
while we aren’t doe-eyed about the challenges in making it happen, it is our 
hope that setting out these arguments might at least begin the conversation 
about how to actually bridge these gaps. 
That being said, assuming the technology sector, advocacy groups, and the 
law enforcement and national security communities come to the table ready to 
work creatively and collaboratively, and ready to make tough choices and ac-
cept tough tradeoffs, to solve the encryption challenge, below are a few sug-
gestions for how they might do so. Again, these suggestions are only meant to 
spur serious discussion; ultimately a solution will be identified only through 
serious and persistent dialogue among technologists, privacy experts, and 
counterterrorism officials. 
Declassify Information relating to Terrorists’ use of Encryption and the Impact 
of Encryption on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Efforts. 
Among the chief problems that the law enforcement and national security 
communities face when trying to articulate the gravity of their concerns regard-
ing the growing use by terrorists of encryption is to prove that it is in fact hap-
pening. This is the same basic concern that has plagued the national security 
community in trying to convince a skeptical public that its repeated warnings 
about the threat posed by terrorism is real and not simply an effort by govern-
ment to scare the American public. While the attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, 
and Brussels suggest that the alarms sounded by government were legitimate, 
skeptics continue to argue that the government’s claims that terrorists are using 
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encryption to plot terrorist attacks are unfounded and speculative.135 
As our former colleague, Carrie Cordero, has wisely pointed out, it is critical 
that the government declassifies and makes public the facts underlying FBI 
Director Comey’s claim that encryption presents real challenges to criminal 
prosecutions and protecting our national security.136 To date, precious little de-
tail has been provided by the FBI and, as Cordero notes, “[i]t will take more 
than a sampling of case anecdotes to make the case.”137 Cordero argues, cor-
rectly in our view, that the government should—as it did with CALEA in 
1994—provide Congress and the public detailed statistics to make its case, and 
subjecting those claims to empirical testing by the Government Accountability 
Office and political testing on Capitol Hill.138 
Undoubtedly declassifying such information will provide terrorist groups 
with additional information about what the U.S. government knows about their 
communications methodologies and platforms. As a result, it may very well 
serve to push them deeper underground and towards more secure and therefore 
harder to access technologies. However, given the importance of this issue, 
when combined with the scope and nature of the disclosures already made to 
date as a result of the Snowden leaks, in our view the government should seri-
ously consider declassifying information—including a number of specific case 
studies—to help demonstrates terrorists’ move to encryption following the 
Snowden disclosures as well as the use of American technology by these 
groups. Doing so would provide concrete data points for the American pub-
lic—and American companies—in recognizing that terrorists are exploiting 
encryption to evade detection while they plot against the United States and are 
using the nation’s infrastructure and technology, both at home and overseas, to 
do so. 
Establish a Blue Ribbon Commission. 
Many of the more specific proposals set forth below might usefully be con-
sidered by a bipartisan, blue ribbon commission composed of technologists, 
former government officials, security experts, privacy advocates, and other key 
stakeholders in an effort to reach consensus outside the normal policy and po-
litical processes. While such commissions admittedly have a checkered track 
record of actually achieving policy success, they have, on occasion, been able 
                                                          
 135 Ryan Hagemann, Encryption Was Not Responsible for the Paris Terrorist Attacks, 
NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://bit.ly/1QH8Vhw (considering the speculative nature 
of the connection between the Paris terrorist attacks and encryption). 
 136 Carrie Cordero, Weighing in On the Encryption and “Going Dark” Debate, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 4, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://bit.ly/1TFKhEq. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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to demonstrate a solid consensus that, over time, might actually result in bipar-
tisan legislation on Capitol Hill.139  Indeed, Chairman of the House Homeland 
Security Committee Michael McCaul and Senator Mark Warner have recently 
called for the establishment of just such a commission, noting that “it is time to 
come together to confront these challenges.”140 
Encourage or Mandate the Use of Biometric Encryption. 
Some academics and practitioners like Paul Rosenzweig and Herb Lin, one 
of the original authors of the 1990s National Academies of Science report on 
encryption, have suggested the use of biometric encryption, which uses a par-
ticular characteristic of the individual, such as their fingerprint, to generate a 
secure private key for use in encrypting their communications.141 Such a 
scheme wouldn’t build in any backdoors, but would instead require the use of 
what is likely a fairly secure method of protecting a private key.142 At the same 
time, the use of such biometrically generated passcodes would enable law en-
forcement to obtain the access key with a court order from the target of the 
investigation using their biometrics—e.g., their fingerprint, which does not 
implicate the same testimonial Fifth Amendment concerns with seeking to 
compel an individual to verbally provide their passcode to law enforcement.143 
Of course, as Lin points out, these facts will not solve the concerns of the pri-
vacy community, who might also be worried that the widespread availability of 
                                                          
 139 Jordan Tama, In Defense of Blue-Ribbon Commissions, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF 
IDEAS (Apr. 20, 2011, 6:02 PM) http://bit.ly/1YoK1bR; Charles Blahous, How to Run a 
Successful Commission (or Not), ECON. POL’Y FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Dec 16, 2010), 
http://bit.ly/1pbPdnA; see Associated Press, Panel Calls for New War Powers Legislation, 
YOUTUBE (July 8, 2008) http://bit.ly/21XiwrN; see generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
UNITED STATES (2004). 
 140 SEN. MICHAEL MCCAUL & SEN. MARK WARNER, MCCAUL – WARNER COMM’N ON 
DIG. SEC., THE CHALLENGE WE FACE 1 (2016), http://1.usa.gov/27wXHHp. 
 141 Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72; Herb Lin, A Biometric Approach 
as a Partial Step Forward in the Encryption Debate, LAWFARE (Dec. 3, 2015, 3:22 AM) 
[hereinafter Lin, A Biometric Approach], http://bit.ly/1R1tox1. 
 142 Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72. 
 143 Id. 
Biometrics, unlike pass phrases, are almost certainly not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. Hence the use of biometrics would restore the government’s ability to 
secure evidence of criminality through lawful process….[and] access to data through a 
biometric would systematically be much more likely to be achieved by direct interac-
tion with the subject of the investigation, restoring the notice aspect of data access that 
formerly had existed. 
Id.; Lin, A Biometric Approach, supra note 141. 
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biometric samples, like fingerprints, could significantly reduce security.144 In 
addition, Lin notes that the imprecision of some biometrics and the potential 
weakness of a given biometric-based key may create technological challenges 
to widespread use of biometrics for passcode generation.145 
Differentiate Between Approaches to Data at Rest versus Data in Transit. 
Many commentators have suggested that different rules regarding encryp-
tion may be appropriate for data at rest versus data in transit. Rosenzweig, for 
example, is less concerned with default data in transit encryption—and pre-
sumably law enforcement ought feel likewise—because “it conflicts with ser-
vice provider business models.”146 The authors of the Harvard Berkman Center 
paper also note that many providers rely on access to user transmitted data to 
enable targeted advertising and thus satisfy their advertising revenue models, 
and as a result, are highly unlikely to put in place full, end-to-end encryption.147 
Given this, consensus may be more easily achieved if the relevant constituen-
cies work to identify a workable approach for data at rest separate from efforts 
to identify a solution for data in transit rather than trying to address both in one 
fell swoop. 
The “Try It Out” Approach. 
Paul Rosenzweig suggested one rational approach to address the legitimate 
concerns of the advocacy groups that any provision for lawful access inherent-
ly makes the Internet fundamentally less secure could be to require that any 
proposal and methodology for providing lawful access be made available for 
public review and scrutiny for one year prior to implementation.148 During that 
period, hackers, security professionals and the like would have the opportunity 
to stress test the proposal and methodology to determine whether it satisfies 
security and privacy concerns.149 If so, and NIST judges it to have remained 
secure, then it would be implemented; if it were hacked, then the government 
would presumably go back to the drawing board.150 
                                                          
 144 Lin, A Biometric Approach, supra note 141. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, supra note 72. 
 147 OLSON ET AL., supra note 99, at 10. 
 148 Paul Rosenzweig, Testing Encryption Insecurity: A Modest Proposal, LAWFARE (July 
7, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://bit.ly/1LN7p0J. 
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Take Steps to Limit the Use of Non-Accessible Encryption Platforms. 
Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government instituted a series 
of reforms, authorized under the USA PATRIOT Act, which require banks to 
adopt tighter ‘know your customer’ rules or face higher business costs and risk 
exclusion from the international banking system.151 These regulations, enforced 
under authorities of the U.S. Treasury Department, had an immediate and sig-
nificant impact on the ability of the government to kick terrorists off of the 
global financial network.152 In much the same way as terrorists were previously 
exploiting the global financial system for terrorist financing purposes, they are 
now exploiting the global telecommunications system to communicate to re-
cruit followers, incite them to violence, and plan attacks. Similar to the ‘know 
your customer rules’ enforced by Treasury, it may be possible to establish a 
program to ‘designate’ electronic communication service providers that refuse 
to enable a means for lawful government access to terrorist communications.153 
This program could then impose costs (both reputational and regulatory) on 
Internet ‘backbone’ companies if they permit communications from customers 
of designated providers to traverse their telecommunications infrastructure.154  
Such a program would enable the U.S. government to effectively drive en-
crypted terrorist communications off of the international communications grid, 
regardless of the jurisdiction in which the designated entity maintains its base 
of operations. In other words, the efficacy of such a regime is not tied solely to 
designated entities based in the United States. Moreover, this type of program 
would not require the creation of new surveillance authorities, but would in-
stead restore the government’s ability to gain access to terrorist communica-
tions under existing authorities. In addition, this type of program would not 
seek to impose specific technical requirements on encryption providers, though 
it would provide strong incentives for them to enable lawful government ac-
cess in terrorism cases. Finally, if there is sufficient international interest in 
such a model (and to avoid concerns that the model is U.S. centric), it could be 
created and overseen internationally, perhaps through a model that resembles 
the international review mechanism in place under the Terrorist Finance Track-
ing Program.155 
                                                          
 151 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012). 
 152 See generally Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer - Or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 319, 
319 (2012). 
 153 Id. at 333. 
 154 Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003) (“Internet backbones deliver data traffic to and from 
their customers.”). 
 155 Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (May 7, 
2014, 10:24 AM), http://1.usa.gov/1J5eYJv. 
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Implement Device-Specific Front Doors. 
Jonathan Alter has suggested that the government and technology communi-
ty work together to develop a “device-specific ‘front door’ tech solution—a 
key that works only for that specific smartphone and can access only its con-
tents.”156 Others, like the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, have suggested 
a similar approach, such as mandating that all smartphones be able to be un-
locked or accessed by the operating system designer, including by potentially 
prohibiting system designs that make such phones inaccessible to the govern-
ment.157 This approach would be similar to the situation with Apple iPhones 
prior to the introduction of iOS 8, where the government would provide Apple 
with a court order relating to a specific phone and Apple would use its own 
capabilities to access the encrypted data at rest on that specific device.158 Alter 
also notes that in order to ensure that privacy was fully protected, new laws 
that limit the collection and use of information obtained from the authorized 
device may need to be put in place.159 
Ensuring Lawful Access to Information Available to Companies for Business 
Purposes. 
As mentioned above, the Berkman paper notes that a number of technology 
providers, like Google, earn revenue by accessing a significant amount of user 
information and content.160  Because such providers will have access to the 
plaintext of otherwise encrypted data, the Berkman authors argue that the chal-
lenge posed to the government’s by encryption can be mitigated by ensuring 
lawful access to the data the company accesses for its business purposes.161 
Underlining this point, as noted above, the Manhattan District Attorney’s re-
port indicates that many of the types of data available on an Android 
                                                          
 156 Alter, supra note 79. 
 157 MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 13. 
Federal legislation would provide in substance that any smartphone manufactured, 
leased, or sold in the U.S. must be able to be unlocked, or its data accessed, by the op-
erating system designer. Compliance with such a statute would not require new tech-
nology or costly adjustments. It would require, simply, that designers and makers of 
operating systems not design or build them to be impregnable to lawful governmental 
searches. 
Id. 
 158 See Legal Process Guidelines: U.S. Law Enforcement, APPLE 3, 9 (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://apple.co/1R3RUnm (“For iOS devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, 
upon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can 
extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices.”). 
 159 Alter, supra note 79. 
 160 OLSON ET AL., supra note 99, at 10. 
 161 Id. at 10-12. 
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smartphone may, under certain circumstances, be available in the Google 
Cloud.162 Given this, one potential way to address the concerns posed by en-
cryption could be to make companies like Google amenable to domestic pro-
cess for their global stores of data and ensure that they have technical capabili-
ties in place to provide access to the government pursuant to a lawful court 
order, at least to the extent that the data subject to such orders is data that the 
company accesses for its own business purposes. Such an effort could be ac-
complished through modest modifications to CALEA or through separate new 
statute. 
Updating CALEA to Require Technical Bypass or Data Retention. 
In a similar vein, Professor Orin Kerr has suggested adopting CALEA or 
E911 type regulations requiring manufacturers to have technical means to by-
pass smartphone passcodes or requiring data retention of specific types of data, 
including the content of, for example, text messages.163 While Professor Kerr 
himself has since walked away from the former proposal164 and the latter ap-
proach, long discussed as a potential option, has never really gained any seri-
ous traction, they are nevertheless additional options that policymakers and 
advocacy groups should explore further. 
Implementing a Session Key Encapsulation and Key Splitting Approach for 
Private Escrow.  
 
Some have also suggested a system requiring that service providers log pri-
                                                          
 162 See MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 7. 
 163 Kerr, Apple’s Dangerous Game, supra note 31. In the former article, Kerr also sug-
gests that the government might raise penalties on the failure of an individual to employ 
their own passcode to access a smartphone. Id. This is in line with his view. See discussion 
supra note 124. We chose not to include this potential solution in our list of broad options 
because Prof. Kerr relies in significant part on In re Boucher and his own particular reading 
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vene the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination privilege. In our view, reading Boucher for 
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See, e.g., MANHATTAN D.A.’S REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 nn.15 & 17. 
 164 See Orin Kerr, Apple’s Dangerous Game, Part 2: The Strongest Counterargument, 
WASH. POST, (Sept. 22, 2014), http://wapo.st/1W4qJXD (“[I]f Apple’s longstanding back-
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that backdoor to gain unauthorized remote access, then closing that backdoor adds a security 
benefit at the same time it imposes the unfortunate cost of thwarting valid warrants.”). 
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vate session keys and split the key for preservation between several different 
entities.165 Such a system—if it uses encapsulated and re-encrypted keys that 
are split amongst a number of private sector key holders employing an “M-of-
N system” would address concerns regarding the creation of a single point of 
failure for exploitation in gaining access to decryption keys.166  Under such a 
system, only one session at a time would be available per key pair recovered 
and the government would have to issue service of process to multiple private 
sector providers, M-of-N of whom would need to comply with (or could chal-
lenge) the government’s request in order to recover each session key. Of 
course, like any key escrow system—even with its significantly heightened 
level of security born of key encapsulation and key splitting and the limited 
access it provides to a single session—this notional construct is likely to face 
serious challenges in the public debate, particularly given the resonance of the 
key escrow debate from the 1990s.167 
Vet a Formal Proposal. 
Dr. Herb Lin has suggested that the government propose a specific lawful 
access authority for public scrutiny and vetting, in order to enable robust con-
                                                          
 165 See, e.g., Rosenzweig, Encryption Keys, supra note 112. 
All of which suggests one possible business development would be for the providers 
to develop disposable one-time keys for each individual transmission, that they don’t 
retain. My understanding from my technical friends is that this is currently theoretical-
ly possible, but difficult to implement on a large-scale basis. If, however, they want to 
retain customer confidence this may become a higher priority for some service pro-
viders. 
Id. 
 166 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples 
With Clash Between Privacy, Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://wapo.st/1TnqdpI. 
 167 See Matt Blaze, AT&T Bell Labs., Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption 
Standard 1-2 (1994), http://bit.ly/1X8334I (explaining technical flaws in the Clipper chip 
that allowed a malicious user to evade the built in government decryption access to the 
Clipper system); Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994), 
http://nyti.ms/1RPhnhl. 
Employing normal cryptography, two parties can communicate in total privacy, with 
both of them using a digital “key” to encrypt and decipher the conversation or mes-
sage. A potential eavesdropper has no key and therefore cannot understand the con-
versation or read the data transmission. But with Clipper, an additional key – created 
at the time the equipment is manufactured – is held by the Government in escrow. 
With a court-approved wiretap, an agency like the F.B.I. could listen in. By adding 
Clipper chips to telephones, we could have a system that assures communications will 
be private—from everybody but the Government. 
Id.; see generally ANDI WILSON, DANIELLE KEHL & KEVIN BANKSTON, OPEN TECH. INST., 
DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY? LESSONS FROM THE CRYPTO WARS OF THE 1990S, at 5-11 
(2015) http://bit.ly/1Svw8bm. 
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sideration and dialogue, in order to avoid the problem of both sides talking past 
one another.168 In doing so, Dr. Lin proposes that the ensuing privacy and secu-
rity debate focus on the anticipated time that it would take for the proposal to 
be compromised by cyber-attack.169 Specifically, the question Lin proposes is 
whether the mean time to compromise is closer to one minute or 1000 years.170 
If one minute, the proposal should be abandoned; if 1000 years, the proposal 
should be strongly considered.171 Dr. Lin believes that such a test would pro-
vide a measurable metric, supported by fact-based claims, which can be exam-
ined, tested, and verified to determine whether the government proposal should 
be pursued.172 In Ben Wittes’s view, this proposal does not align with the FBI’s 
desires insofar as it asks the government to proffer a proposal, whereas the 
FBI: 
[W]ants to leave the development task to Silicon Valley to figure out how to imple-
ment government’s requirements...[they] want[] to describe what [they] need[]—
decrypted signal when [the FBI] has a warrant—and leave the companies to figure out 
how to deliver it while still providing secure communications in other circumstances 
to their customers.173 
 
Regardless of whether it is government, the technology sector, or the two 
working together (which we think is the best approach), the core of Lin’s pro-
posal—that something concrete be put on the table—would still seem to pro-
vide a measurable and testable metric for the long-term security and efficacy of 
an approach to responsibly addressing the needs of law enforcement in an era 
of strong encryption.174 
                                                          
 168 See Herb Lin, Making Progress on the Encryption Debate, LAWFARE (Feb. 24, 2015, 
1:24 PM), http://bit.ly/1TnqtoM (arguing that the government should provide the private 
sector with an opportunity to independently test a proposed government-only access mecha-
nism). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Ben Wittes, Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the 
Merits, LAWFARE (July 12, 2015, 2:00 PM) [hereinafter Wittes, Going Dark: Part II], 
http://bit.ly/1nslJQD. 
 174 See id. 
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Implement a Government Proposal through Vetting, Mandates, Liability 
Imposition, Letting Foreign Governments Take the Lead, or Waiting for a 
More Favorable Environment.  
 
Wittes suggests five ways we might build off of Lin’s general approach.175  
First, the government could start with a detailed “concept paper” that can be 
“evaluated, critiqued, and vetted.”176 Another option would be to simply re-
quire the industry, as a matter of law, to provide law enforcement access.177 In 
Wittes’s view, given market incentives, it is likely companies “will devote re-
sources to the question of how to do so while still providing consumer securi-
ty.”178 A third option would be to employ the potential for civil liability to in-
centivize companies to focus on these issues.179 That is, one could create a (or 
take advantage of an existing) cause of action that allows damages to be recov-
ered from a third party provider that is aware of the potential use of its systems 
by terrorists, with the expectation that the possibility of having to pay out will 
encourage companies to develop secure systems quickly.180 A fourth approach 
would be to let other governments go first, likely China and the United King-
dom.181 And a fifth and final approach is waiting for a shift in the situation on 
the ground; as Wittes notes, 
If Comey is right and we start seeing law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies blind in investigating and preventing horrible crimes and significant 
threats, the pressure on the companies is going to shift […] Whereas the com-
panies now feel intense pressure to assure customers that their data is safe from 
NSA […] In extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary access may well seem 
reasonable. And people will wonder why it doesn’t exist.182 
Overall, Wittes’s view—and one that likely has significant merit—is that we 
ought pursue multiple lines of attack, including the proof of concept, civil lia-
bility reform, and continuing the political pressure.183 While Wittes’s construct 
is certainly helpful in understanding the various possible approaches to work-
ing through this problem, and while we are generally supportive of efforts 
along multiple fronts simultaneously, we strongly caution against a wait-and-
see approach, which, as we have argued, would result in decisive action only in 
the aftermath of a catastrophic terrorist attack and would, as a result, have neg-
                                                          
 175 See id. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. 
 178 See Wittes, Going Dark: Part II, supra note 173. 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See generally id. 
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ative consequences for both privacy and security. 
Develop More Robust Endpoint Access and Adopt Related Policies. 
Lin and others have also proposed that a fairly straightforward solution to 
the data in transit issue could be new authorities that enhance lawful govern-
ment access to communication endpoints.184 Some have argued that the gov-
ernment should actively exploit vulnerabilities it has knowledge of in order to 
obtain access to endpoints for the purpose of conducting properly authorized 
surveillance.185 The challenge here, of course, is that the government doesn’t 
have reliable and available access to communications endpoints for a number 
of reasons including the inaccessibility of overseas endpoints, and the time and 
resources that it takes to secure such access, time and resources that otherwise 
might be saved if the government had access to the relevant data in transit, par-
ticularly through a provider where multiple endpoints, such as burner phones 
or email accounts, may be surveilled under a single order. As proponents of 
this approach rightfully note, this form of “lawful hacking” presents unique 
challenges beyond sporadic access and unreliability, including concerns re-
garding government exploitation of identified vulnerabilities rather than taking 
steps to publicly acknowledge these vulnerabilities and assist the private sector 
in addressing them, and the potential reputational damage to U.S. companies if 
they are perceived as working with the government on a voluntary, rather than 
compulsory, basis. 186 The resolution to the former problem, according to the 
proponents of lawful hacking is immediate reporting by the government except 
in exceptional cases; according to these authors, given patch development, 
patching inconsistency, and the relatively high number of potential vulnerabili-
                                                          
 184 See, e.g., Herb Lin, Another Take on the Lessons of Paris Shootings for Encryption, 
LAWFARE (Nov. 27, 2015, 1:14 PM), http://bit.ly/1U8Qfff. 
Encrypted communications must be decrypted and displayed for the terrorist or crimi-
nal to read them, and thus they can be captured by on-device software. Message cap-
turing software could be pushed only to individuals under suspicion (and only with 
appropriate legal oversight). In principle, there is no reason that government authori-
ties could not read encrypted terrorist communications a few moments after the terror-
ist read them. 
Id. 
 185 See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities 
for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 24-44 (2014); see also 
Susan Landau, Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark: Counterpart, LAWFARE (July 15, 
2015, 3:27 PM), http://bit.ly/1TnqN73 (“Devices — laptops, phones, any object running 
complex software — have flaws. When there are such vulnerabilities, there is room for at-
tack, for downloading a wiretap against the device and tapping the communications before 
those communications are encrypted.”). 
 186 See Bellovin et al., supra note 185, at 47-48. 
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ties available, the government’s ability to obtain communications should not be 
significantly compromised.187 In reality, however, top-notch capabilities often 
look to exploit relatively narrow vulnerabilities—including zero days188—that 
are few and far between in particular systems. That is, simply saying that a 
large number of vulnerabilities exist and that immediate reporting and patching 
won’t slow the government down doesn’t make it so. Of course, there is much 
to be said about the relative tradeoffs here189 and there is significant merit to 
the argument that if the government is able to significantly strengthen its abili-
ties to obtain endpoint access, both in terms of laws and capabilities, such ad-
vances could mitigate some reasonable aspect of the encryption challenge. 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
Despite the urgency of the problem, the government has done little to restore 
its ability to gain access to terrorist communications. No doubt the technologi-
cal issues posed by encryption are extremely complex,190 and there may be no 
silver bullet. Yet to a significant degree, the government’s failure to act deci-
sively is the direct result of voices, both from within the government and from 
the tech sector and advocacy organizations,191 which would simultaneously 
claim technological impossibility while decrying government efforts to en-
hance its law enforcement and national security tools. The hyperbolic policy 
arguments that any such enhancements necessarily entail a heightened risk of 
government abuse and hegemony, and that any solution that enables govern-
ment access to terrorist communications would also result in the degradation of 
the availability of strong encryption to promote internet freedom and privacy, 
                                                          
 187 See id. at 52-53. 
 188 Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is a Zero Day?, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM) 
http://bit.ly/1QyOyp3. 
Zero-day vulnerability refers to a security hole in software—such as browser software 
or operating system software—that is yet unknown to the software maker or to antivi-
rus vendors. This means the vulnerability is also not yet publicly known, though it 
may already be known by attackers who are quietly exploiting it. […] Zero-day ex-
ploit refers to code that attackers use to take advantage of a zero-day vulnerability. 
Id. 
 189 Marshall Erwin, The High Standard of Proof in the Encryption Debate, JUST SEC. 
(Feb. 5, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://bit.ly/24MWgn1. 
 190 Matt Blaze, A Key Under the Doormat Isn’t Safe. Neither Is An Encryption Backdoor, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2015), http://wapo.st/1QCLKsc (“Despite many advances in comput-
er science, building a secure access feature is actually harder now than it was when Clipper 
failed in the 1990s. This is partly because we now rely on encryption integrated deeply into 
systems that are more complex, and fragile, than ever.”). 
 191 Alex Abdo, ACLU to UN: Encryption is Not A Problem to be Solved, But a Crucial 
Tool For Freedom and Security, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:56 AM), 
http://bit.ly/1pbQlYz. 
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for example, for dissidents who want to speak out about repressive regimes 
have had a polarizing effect on the debate. 
While there is no doubt there are very real tradeoffs between privacy and se-
curity, particularly for those defending the values of freedom and liberty over-
seas, the conflation of factual impossibility with policy claims regarding such 
trade-offs strangles any form of real discussion. In our view, it is inappropriate 
to allow the policy debate over the value of such trade-offs to be held hostage 
by continuing claims of technological impossibility, a claim that is fundamen-
tally at war with the thousands of years of human ingenuity and technological 
innovation; innovation that has often solved major problems once thought in-
tractable. 
As a result, while the arguments and rhetoric surrounding the current chal-
lenges and virtues of encryption should be fully explored as part of a broader 
engagement on terrorist use of the Internet, but they cannot be allowed to 
frighten policymakers from finding a solution. The need to shore up defenses 
from terrorism demands a solution. If the attacks in Paris occurred in New 
York City, or if the United States face another major terrorist attack on its soil, 
the American public will demand a solution. The pendulum will swing back to 
national security. And in the frantic efforts to find a solution at all costs, priva-
cy and free Internet concerns will take a back seat to the needs of the law en-
forcement and national security communities. Sadly, this is expected to be an 
inevitability given ISIL’s and al-Qaida’s determination to strike the U.S. 
homeland, and given our diminished ability to thwart them. 
In our view, security and privacy are best served by finding common ground 
on the encryption matter now, in the relative calm, rather waiting to act in the 
aftermath of an attack when security will already have been sacrificed and pri-
vacy will pay a significant long term cost. 
For this reason, the tech sector and advocacy groups should be incentivized 
to come to the negotiating table now, and help law enforcement and the na-
tional security community acquire the tools they need to re-establish insights 
into terrorist plotting, under a regime sensitive to privacy and free internet con-
cerns. We’ve set out a number of potential proposals that might be considered 
during such a group negotiation. In particular, two proposals that deserves se-
rious consideration now is the declassification of information related to terror-
ists use of American providers and encryption and the creation of a blue ribbon 
panel to vet some of the proposals mentioned above as well as others. Given 
the threat we face and the very real challenges posed both to national security 
and privacy, inaction and policy incrementalism or policy creep are not valid 
approaches to address this issue. As such, we stand ready to support our friends 
and colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we come together to address this 
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difficult and pressing issue. 
 
